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In the late summer of 1861 the American Missionary 
Association sent missionaries to teach and distribute relief 
goods to the contraband Negroes at Fortress Monroe. This 
effort began missions that eventually grew into successful 
experiments to settle and educate the thousands of refugee 
slaves that flocked to the Hampton Roads area during the 
Civil War. During 1862 the missions underwent a difficult 
period struggling to progress in the midst of active mili-
tary campaigns and conservative politics. The ability of 
the contrabands to overcome the difficulties of this early 
period to establish homes and schools, and labor peacefully 
on the farms influenced federal policy to carry out 
emancipation. 
After the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 Norfolk 
and Portsmouth became the sites of two experiments to dis-
cover a workable method of acquainting the newly freed 
slaves with free labor status in a complex society. The 
educational aspect of these experiments led to the develop-
ment of a system of schools encompassing the student popu-
lation in the Twin Cities, adjoining experimental farms, 
the efforts of many benevolent societies, and the army . Two 
factors set the consistency needed to insure steady progress 
to develop the schools from infancy, The AMA kept a tight 
rein on the activities of their missionaries, and the army 
personnel remained in the system throughout the war period. 
The resulting systemization of the schools in an urban-rural 
cross section in the mainstream of the active military con-
flict cast the mold for a workable system for Postwar 
Reconstruction. The blueprint became the prototype used 
to organize the Freedmen's Bureau schools in Virginia. 
These schools matured into one of the most successful 
state systems within the Bureau, and made education the 
most lasting contribution of the Reconstruction era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Virginia Freedmen's school system was one of the 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands' most 
successful education efforts in post-war Reconstruction. Of 
the fourteen states with freedmen's schools in 1865, Virginia, 
Louisiana, and North Carolina held approximately half of 
the 575 schools, 1,171 teachers and 71,799 students. The 
American Missionary Association (AMA) in Virginia which 
preceded the Bureau system began as early as September 1861, 
and developed steadily during the whole of wartime Recon-
struction. 
By 1865 the missions operated successful systems at 
schools in Norfolk, Portsmouth and Hampton, created a blue-
print for systemized education, and served as a training 
ground for personnel. These personnel generalized their 
Hampton Roads experience to the state as a whole through 
the use of the blueprint. By 1869 the system operated 
many Normal as well as primary schools, erected over 200 
schoolhouses and taught over 50,000 Freedmen the primary 
elements of education. The system largely closed in 1870, 
when the Bureau ceased operating, but the Virginia educa-
tional effort that institutionalized public education in 
Virginia broke much ground. It became one of the few 
positive legacies of post-war Reconstruction. 
The Hampton Roads area presented an ideal location for 
the beginning of the contraband missions. It served 
1 
as a supply station for the James peninsula campaigns and 
the naval blockade of confederate ports. The presence of 
the refugees who flocked to the federal haven forced the 
2 
army to initiate policies regulating the Negroes' movement 
and treatment. In the midst of .. pressures of a main theater of 
the war these . policy changes · caused the missions to evolve in 
the same manner as the wartime reconstruction struggles of 
the nation itself. In a sense the development of the 
missions reveal many insights to the development of 
Federal reconstruction policy. 
The development of the missions depended on changes 
of federal policy in response to a balance between the abo-
litionist and conservative forces in the North and the 
fortunes of war. It reflected the growing control of 
abolitionist forces over public opinion in the North, the 
development of field evidence that accelerated that process, 
and the breakthroughs in the contraband community's cultural 
revolution that resulted from that process. The four-year 
struggle illuminated the social changes of the contraband 
and freedmen of the area, the structure and e~ficiency of 
the A.MA and the dedication of the missionaries and army 
personnel associated with the project. 
Reconstruction policy became increasingly more liberal 
toward the refugees as the war progressed. When the war 
continued to be a stalemate in the summer of 1862, the 
opinion and support of the people of the North became an 
increasingly important factor. As the potential of the 
slaves became lmown from education and free labor projects, 
the North became that much more incensed at the idea of 
suppressing intelligent Negroes in a system of slavery. 
During the same period of time Congress paved the way for 
emancipation in a series of measures, and after two years 
of fighting at best a draw, Lincoln needed the issue of 
emancipation to unite the North behind the continuing war 
effort. 
J 
The first, largest and best organized of the abolitionist 
missionary organizations -- the AMA -- had a long and highly 
sophisticated ann ot et~iciency, They created resettle-
ment and education experiments in Virginia, North Carolina 
and the Sea Islands and the Mississippi Valley in conjunc-
tion with army superintendents. They reported their efforts 
and results to each mission and among the member congrega-
tions and subscribers in the North. From their audience 
came contributions of money, labor, materials, time and 
added teacher's enthusiasm. In addition radical politicians 
used that information to demand guarantees of :t'reedom, 
education, land and protection for the slaves from Congress 
and the Lincoln administration. 
The AMA wisely printed letters from the1most idealistic 
and moved workers in their monthly periodical, but the 
most important mission personnel were the mission organizers 
or superintendents whose letters contained too many problems 
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and struggles to be published. These men were the prag-
matic idealists who organized and administered the field 
work for the contrabands, the missionaries and its teachers. 
They created, organized and controlled the mission-army 
structure of farms and schools. 
As the war progressed after 186J, federal policy 
drew closer and closer to the aspirations of the Radical 
Republicans until the two almost coincided. The result 
was a continually expanding policy that endeavored to 
provide a new way of life for the contrabands. 
As the missions succeeded, William H. Woodbury, a 
German professor from Massachusetts, and Orlando Brown, a 
Connecticut surgeon, developed effective resettlement 
programs on confiscated farms, and a system of schools on 
these and in the cities. At the end of the war and the 
beginning of the Freedmen's Bureau, both Woodbury and Brown 
moved to Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent of 
Education, respectively, for the State of Virginia. Their 
educational program at Norfolk and Portsmouth became the 
model to organize the schools served by many different 
benevolent organizations on a statewide basis. 
The problems of the infant Bureau in that first year 
were staggering. Orlando Brown concentrated on the land 
and subsistence problems of the Freedmen while Woodbury 
who had to return North, left the school problems to his 
assistant, Ralza M. Manly. The latter garnered authority 
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among the benevolent s ocieties and instituted the educational 
blueprint that Woodbury and Brown deve l oped in Norfolk t he 
year before. The result was that many different societies 
cooperated to provide teachers to the urban areas of south-
east Virginia and succeeded in teaching fifty thousand Freed-
men over a five-year period. 
Primary responsibility for the success of the schools 
lies with the AMA and dedicated army personnel. After 
spending years in the Hampton Roads' missions, they 
generalized the experiences they had gained to the state as 
a whole through the Norfolk blueprint. The most positive 
result of Post-war Reconstruction, the education of the 
Freedmen, was largely due to their efforts. 
CHAPTER I 
Setting the Foundation 
As Abraham Lincoln bent to sign the autograph book that 
Sojourner Truth carried with her, s he said to him, "If I could 
write my name I might have done something with my life. You 
wrote yours and you freed a people. 111 This statement i ndicated 
the high importance that the slaves and freedom of the 1860's 
placed on education. Without the ability to read and write 
black men and women could not communicate over long distances, 
understand work contracts, negotiate bills of credit, read town 
laws, or hope for any but the most limited lines of work, They 
saw education as the key to their integration into a new 
southern culture after their freedom, and thus a guarantee of 
that freedom itself. 
In the first year of the Civil War, 1861, the American 
Missionary Association (AMA) began developing a mission system 
that eventually became a blueprint for the Virginia Freedmen's 
Bureau school system between 1865 and 1870. The initial stage 
of the system consisted of laying the foundation for contraband 
missions at the Hampton Roads area. During this time the 
relationship between the army and the missionaries supplied the 
background for the first step of the slave refugees from 
slavery to freedom. A short period of initial cooperation 
flourished between the army and the first mission in the Fall of 1861, 
but soon the necessity to use all resources to prosecute the war, 
dissident actions of subordinate anti-negro officers and men, and 
6 
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Lincoln's policy of simply reuniting the Union at any cost caused 
the army's attitude· to gradually degenerate into an ambigious and 
niggardly policy toward the contrabands. 
The army supplied the contraband population with food, housing, 
clothing, and protection from their southern masters. In return the 
slaves worked on fortifications and provided intelligence when 
they arrived within the military lines. The friends of the contrabands 
the abolitionists, missionaries, and radical politicans, created a 
driving force which was a combination of public opinion and 
practical necessity to convince the army to further help the refugees, 
and also administered and operated the programs that aided the 
slaves to become repatriated. The success of the Hampton Roads 
missions resulted from the gradual overcoming of the many obstacles 
to lay a base for mission operations after the first year of the war. 
Map of Hampton Roads showing 
i ts strategic position as 
guardian of the shipping lanes 
to Norfolk and Portsmouth and 
Richmond. Norfolk and Portsmouth 
are on the southern side of the 
Roads within easy distance over-
land of the plantation counties 
of North Carolina. Refugees 
could easily slip into these 
cities and then try to boat across 
to Fortress Monroe, Hamnton, 
and Mill Creek. 
In April of 1861 Hampton Roads was in Union hands. For-
tress Monroe furnished a strategic position for the army to 
prosecute the war against the Confederacy, and an ideal 
collecting point for runaway slaves. It guarded Old Point 
Comfort at the confluence of the James River, the Elizabeth 
River, and the Chesapeake Bay. 2 Hampton township was three 
miles west of the Fortress and Newport News was seven miles 
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west of Hampton. Southwest across Hampton Roads, Norfolk and 
Portsmouth faced each other on the south branch of the Elizabeth 
River. South of Portsmouth the Gosport Naval Yard provided the 
majority of employment in Portsmouth and was in a strategic 
position to service the navy of either side. The Yard built 
and serviced ships of the fleet, and the Fortress protected the 
entrance to the Chesapeake Bay, and then to the Atlantic. In 
late April the Navy Yard, Norfolk, and Portsmouth fell to a 
great influx of Confederate soldiers, and the Union occupied 
only the fort.3 
Fortress Monroe contained sixty-three acres of walled-in 
ground on a sandbar separated from the end of the James penin-
sula by Mill Creek and a small swampy area. It began an 
~ighty-five mile access route to Richmond overland through 
lowlying farms by way of Yorktown and Williamsburg. After the 
fall of Fort Sumter, Lincoln rushed reinforcements by boat to 
the small garrison in the Fort. He felt the Union could afford 
to lose Norfolk and Portsmouth, but it was necessary to keep 
Monroe because it served as a supply base for the naval 
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blockade, and armies that might eventually move up the penin-
sula.4 
General Benjamin F. Butler received command of Fortress 
Monroe on May 22, 1861 in the newly created Department of 
Virginia. As the first three refugees from Hampton entered 
his lines he quickly established a guideline to retain the 
refugees. 5 Realizing the problem of keeping the slaves 
without any regulations or direction, needing men to erect 
fortifications, and wishing to deprive the South of their 
labor supply, Butler decided to use the runaway slaves and 
labeled them "contraband of war. 116 With this designation 
he could legally keep the Negroes, use them to help build 
the many redoubts needed, and give them housing and sub-
sistence for their labor. 
The general's action resulted from a previous lesson 
well learned and set a precedent though he dissented from 
both the administration and the die-hard abolitionists 
who wanted to simply free all the slaves. A few weeks earlier 
he put his Massachusetts troops at the disposal of Maryland's 
Governor Thomas Hicks to put down a potential slave insurrec-
tion and received a severe rebuke from Governor Andrew for his 
effort.7 Realizing the current direction of Massachusetts 
opinion and its possible effect on his political career, he 
seized the chance to both benefit the slaves and solve his logis-
tic problem at Monroe. Regardless of his motives the order s1uck 
even though Ccrgress and the aanmistra.tlon :Oliled to make it offic ial 
until months later. It set the precedent of creating contra-
band policy according to the commander's initiative and the 
necessity of the situation. 
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With a close proximity to tidewater Virginia and the 
northern counties of North Carolina, refugee slaves almost immedi-
ately travelled by boat and on foot to seek asylum in the 
Union stronghold. First just a few came, but as the Union l ines 
expanded and the possibility of sanctuary became known on the 
spiritual grapevine, the trickle became a flood. At the 
beginning Butler was simply interested in confiscating slave 
labor, but as the refugees poured into the lines he realized 
that he needed to establish some policy for their keep. 8 
Despite the contraband order the Lincoln administration 
abstained from making an official policy standardizing the 
treatment of the slaves who poured into the Union lines. 9 The 
administration Unionists wished to reunite the Union as quickly 
as possible, without confronting the thorny issue of freedom 
of the slaves. The contraband initially were an embarrassment 
and later a hindrance to their prosecution of a "Gentlemen's 
War" because the army's protection and assistance alarmed the 
slaveholders in both the Confederate and border states. It 
took little foresight to realize that the Confederates would 
balk at rejoining the Union in the face of a de facto commitment 
against slavery. The border states straddled the fence, but the 
balance represented 50,000 men with or against the Union Army, 
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and possibly the loss of Washington , D.C. In addition the 
contrabands were a possible encumbrance to their armies. The 
refugees needed physical and administrative care besides the 
already extensive needs of the military, they limited the 
army's capacity to move quickly, and strained the lines of 
supply. 10 
Radical antislavery political leaders and organizations 
tried to greatly influence early federal policy toward the 
contraband. Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens led the House 
and Senate in a call for freedom for the slaves from before and 
including the beginning of the war. Six months later, when the 
administration and the army felt content at conducting a 
"Gentlemen's War," abolitionist spokesmen demanded not only 
freedom for the slaves but also constructive programs with the 
contraband to test reconstruction methods and the integration 
of runaway slaves into a more sophisticated culture. 11 In July 
Edward Pierce began the first experiment to evaluate the use of 
contraband labor under a wage rather than slave system at 
Fortress Monroe. The results were outstandingly successful. 
The slaves completed a quarter mile of fortifications in a very 
short time without any physical coercion. 
The American Missionary Association was the most successful 
and organized of the abolitionist organizations that established 
missions to help the contraband. It represented the oldest and 
0 nly missionary society dedicated to that goal. In 1846 Arthur 
and Lewis Tappan and Simeon s. Jocelyn began the AMA 
to consummate the end of slavery. The Association 
originally sent missionaries to Hawaii, China, and 
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the northwest American Indian reservations. 12 Between 1850 
and 1860, it moved into the southern states to contribute to 
the christianization of the poor people, free blacks, and 
slaves and succeeded in the beginning of a large mission in 
Kentucky. Realizing the opportunity that the war offered 
almost at the outset of the conflict in South Carolina, the 
AMA announced in the American Missionary, "that the war would 
create in the South one of the grandest fields of missionary 
labor the world ever furnished." In the summer of 1861 they 
began to make plans to educate the contraband at Fortress 
Monroe •13 
As the only established antislavery missionary society, it 
is not surprising that the AMA made the first contact to the 
army at Hampton Roadso Lewis Tappan wrote General Butler 
regarding the possibility of the organization sending teachers 
to aid the contrabands and possibly removing some of them to the 
north where private organizations could more easily resettle 
and educate them. General Butler responded negatively to the 
offer of teachers and refused to send the contrabands North, 
because the contrabands were largely agricultural laborers 
who would have to adjust to the workshop and trading economy 
of the North, the climate in the South was more agreeable, and 
confiscated land was available to accommodate them. Instead 
the General requested donations of blankets, etc., to aid the 
contrabands. Tappan suspected the government's policy toward 
the contraband was unstable. He notified Butler that, rather 
than contribute a trickle of clothing or other relief goods, 
the AMA would wait to see what happened. 14 
13 
In August 1861 conditions changed substantially. General 
John E. Wool succeeded Butler as Commander of the Department 
of Virginia and 7th Army Ccrps to release the latter for an 
expedition against the forts on Pamlico Sound at North Carolina 
in preparation for a proposed expedition against New Orleans. 15 
In late July the House passed a resolution affirming that 
federal soldiers need not consider it their duty to enforce the 
fugitive slave law. 16 On August 6, after the battle of Bull 
Run drove a spike into the North's confidence, Congress passed 
the first Confiscation Act which allowed local commanders to 
protect "only those slaves who had directly aided the Confederate 
military forces. 1117 The law technically facilitated the 
Administration's policy to leave the institution of slavery 
undisturbed, but in fact aided the prospective contrabands, 
because the burden of proof as to whether or not a slave 
actually worked on Confederate fortifications remained the 
responsibility of the local commander. Without any method to 
verify the refugee's movement before crossing enemy lines, the 
commander simply used his own discretion. Thus, despite the 
official "hands off" policy toward support of the inst!itution 
of slavery, the ConfiscatiJn Act was the Administration's first 
practical step toward emancipation, and the temper of the 
abolitionists in the latter part of August optimistically 
embraced the hope of eventual emancipation. 
14 
At 61 John Street, where the AMA occupied new offices, a 
timely coincidence influenced Tappan's decision to send teachers 
to Fortress Monroe. On August 21 a chaplain of the New York 
Regiment of Volunteers at Camp Butler, Newport News, sent a 
letter to the Young Men's Christian Association of the City 
of New York asking for a missionary to help the Virginia 
contraband. "This letter was brought up to the rooms of the 
AMA by an ordained minister of the Gospel, who had been employed 
by the Young fi'Ien' s Christian Society." 18 Lewis C. Lockwood 
came well recommended by the YMCA, and, no doubt in the light 
of a command change at Fort Monroe and support, no matter how 
limited, for the contraband policy from Congress, Tappan decided 
to send the young Baptist minister to make an investigation into 
the possibility of establishing a mission in the Hampton area. 
The first and most important link in the chain of the 
mission organization was the initial missionary or mission 
organizer. He first dealt with the problems of hunger, 
nakedness, lack of housing, and abuse of the contraband. At the 
same time, he had to live on a very tight budget and plan and 
implement sabbath and regular schools. He reported the progress 
of his charges optimistically, but also the reality of the 
problems confronting further progress, and proposed solutions 
to these pr0blems. It was very trying because the mission 
organizer needed the capability of being a pragmatist and an 
idealist at the same time. 
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Lockwood visited Washington soon after the appointment and 
received approval from the Assistant Secretary of State and a 
recommendation to General Wool. After quickly sailing to 
Fortress Monroe where the General "heartily approved the plan" 
and provided quarters and rations, Lockwood began to establish 
a foothold for the mission. 19 
The young missionary barely arrived before the administra-
tion and the abolitionists began polarizing on policy affecting 
contraband rights. A week earlier General John c. Fremont, 
Union commander in Missouri had proclaimed all the slaves free 
of those in arms against the Union. For two weeks the aboli-
tionists celebrated Fremont's aid to emancipation until Lincoln 
wrote him on September 11 and urged him to conform his procla-
mation to the Confiscation Act. 20 Refusing to endorse the 
general's blanket policy of confiscation, Lincoln revealed the 
administration's commitment to reuniting the Union even at the 
cost of retaining the system of slavery. By this action he 
indicated that even though the onus of confiscation of contra-
bands was the responsibility of the local commands it was 
subject to the approval of the administration. The President's 
order ended the loose armistice that existed between the 
emancipationists and the administration from the beginning of 
the war. 21 Still, Lincoln only meant to deter the threat of 
Fremont's public challenge to the administration's policy. The 
tide of refugee slaves still flowe d unhindered into Monroe 
insuring a willing audience for Lockwood. 
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From the outset the administration's "hands off" policy 
caused many problems for the contrabands and the mission. The 
administration subordinated all efforts of wartime recon-
struction to militarily ending hostilities. 22 The military 
constantly overruled and changed orders affecting contraband 
programs, and to further complicate the problem, regulat i ons 
differed in each local commanding area. In addition the army 
chain of command resisted the execution of controversial or low 
priority orders emanating from headquarters. Recent recruits 
whose regiments consisted of state militia under one unified 
command r emained loyal to themselves, their prejudices and 
their regiments rather than to an obscure general. They often 
ignored orders, interpreted them as they wished, or openly 
flouted them. 23 After the Fremont affair General Wool 
cooperated with Lockwood, but only on a very formal basis and 
his acquiescence for a project was no guarantee that it would 
succeed. Each agreement Lockwood made with General Wool or his 
staff demanded an enormous amount of time and patience to see 
it through the chain of command to practical action. 
In early autumn the most pressing problem in the occupied 
area at Hampton Roads was the squalid living condition of the 
refugees. About nine hundred contrabands huddled on or around 
Point Comfort and Hampton. 24 Slaves in the surrounding areas 
knew by "spiritual telegraph" that they could find refuge and 
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kept arriving at a steady pace. The residents of the town of 
Hampton had fled from Union occupation in early June, and on 
August 7 the Confederate commander a t Yorktown, Colonel 
Magruder, ordered the almost deserted town burned. 25 The 
refugees slept in ruins, crude makeshift shacks, barns, tents, 
and abandoned houses in and around Hampton and on the fortifi-
cations, gun emplacements, the parade ground, and any open area 
at the Fortress. They lived on the remains of salt pork and 
corn, whatever vegetables they could grow, and had little 
clothing. 
With winter approaching, General Wool endeavored to initiate 
some concrete policy to arrange for the contraband's keep. He 
contacted Secretary of War Cameron, but the Secretary only 
suggested sending the excess contraband to Washington to work 
on fortifications. Showing the inconsistency and confusion 
of contraband policy at that early stage, Lincoln changed 
Cameron's order to suggest sending 1,000 refugees south with 
General Thomas W. Sherman to Port Royal. Undaunted and experi-
enced in war strategy, Wool determined to keep the contrabands 
for use in his command and proceeded to create his own policy 
f th . . . 26 or eir provision. 
The General reviewed the wage scheme that he inherited from 
Butler's Board of Survey, which was responsible for the care of 
the refugees during his predecessor's term as commander. The 
highest category of skilled labor had a rate of pay of twenty 
dollars per month, which was thirteen dollars higher than an 
18 
army private's pay. Wool changed the Board's "rates of pay" 
and established a system in which men over eighteen received a 
ceiling of ten dollars per month plus rations and clot hing . 
The system only served to use the runaway slaves for labor 
in trade for army rations, clothing, medical supplies, and 
housingo Of the total pay the men actually received two dollars 
and the balance went into a Quartermaster's fund for the women 
and children and those who could not work. A large percentage 
of the allowance needed to be allotted to those unable to work 
because 500 of the 800 contrabands in the area were women and 
children. Wool also provided for boys and sick or infirm men 
to receive five dollars per month. The total pay was withheld 
altogether if the worker missed "6 continuously or 10 days 
altogether in one month," but a bonus of fifty cents or a 
dollar could be paid for unusually difficult or excessive work. 
Women received the same pay scale. 27 Unfortunately this system 
was not used carefully, and in six months time the quarter-
master's fund built up a reserve of five thousand dollars 
while many laborers remained unpaid for lack of adequate 
records. 
In return for their salary and rations the refugees 
performed many important services for General Wool's command. 
Four hundred contrabands labored in the "quartermaster commis-
sary, medical, ordinance, and other departments" in the occupied 
area. The army used their services as stevedores, laundresses, 
cooks, aides, menial labor, blacksmiths, carpenters, and 
servants for officers. 28 Many of the contrabands were from 
plantations, but since the area conta.ined shipyards, docks, 
freight wharves, and a fair amount of light industry, Wool 
employed more than just a few skilled refugees. 
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Lockwood began the fall by preparing a foundation for a 
permanent mission. To establish strong communication with the 
AM.A secretaries he reported every detail of the day's activities, 
the reactions of the contra.band, and actions of the army to 
Simeon S. Jocelyn, Lewis Tappan, and George M. Whipple, 29 
receiving advice, hope, power of the abolitionist and inde-
pendent press, and a direct line to abolitionist political 
power in return. 
Formal primary schools started in Hampton just east of 
Fortress Monroe, where a large free black population rebuilt 
their homes and churches. Lockwood helped them to establish 
their churches. Mrs. Mary Peake, a mulatto from Alexandria, 
Virginia, ran the most successful one. She received her educa-
tion in a special school for Negroes in the District of Columbia, 
but could not teach because of the stringent laws against the 
education of Negroes in Virginia. 
Lockwood authorized Mrs. Peake's school on September 17, 
1861. By October 1 she taught forty-five children in the 
morning, and offered to teach adults in the afternoon. The 
students learned catechism, singing, spelling, arithmetic, and 
writing.JO Fortunately, she was a free Negro and could move 
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about the area with more facility t han the contrabands. Of the 
seventy-three free Negroes in Hampton Roads, many helped Lock-
wood's church by volunteering to distribute clothes and other 
donations, by providing housing for the refugees whenever 
posGible, and forming a small intelligent manpower pool with 
whom Lockwood could work. Several were experienced preachers, 
and one other, Brother John Herbert, opened a school similar 
to Mary Peake's school. 
The Peake school opened the door to increased Northern aid. 
It was the first school for the contrabands and the AMA's first 
inclination that the contrabands wanted to learn and possessed 
the potential toprogress academically. The students enthusiasm 
convinced the AMA that the contraband represented a "new field 
of usefulness" for Christian missionaries of the North. The 
Hampton experiment, though just begun, showed that Negro 
children could learn the same subjects at the same pace as 
white children, and possessed almost as much of a yearn for 
learning as for freedom. As a supplement to its October issue, 
the AMA ran a several-page article in the American Missionary 
describing the depth of the missionary efforts, the needs of 
the field at Hampton, and the possibility of the contraband' s 
first step to emancipation being education.31 The article used 
Lockwood's efforts and the Peake school as evidence that 
slavery was all the more horrible because it successfull y 
suppressed the ability of the Negro race to learn to the point 
of causing denial that chattels were human because of their 
21 
inability to learn. 
The ANIA realized early that they would not only have to 
send relief supplies and educators, but also pressure the 
administration and the army to adapt existing policy to aid the 
refugee slaves. Experienced at setting up sabbath schools and 
regular schools through their missionaries' efforts, the 
abolitionist organization knew that their main vehicle to 
influence Union policy and public opinion was the results of 
their efforts in the field. Thus they published in the American 
Missionary as much evidence as possible to show that the contra-
band could learn quickly and easily. 
Despite increasingly positive reports in the Missionary 
Lockwood experienced many difficulties securing more extensive 
aid than housing, rations, and passes into restricted areas. 
Typical of his difficulties was an effort to procure a doctor 
for the refugees. In late November Dr. Rufus Brown, the Brigade 
Surgeon, realized that he could not provide the necessary ser-
vices to all the refugees because they were scattered over such 
a large area that he could not visit them and fulfi.11 his regi-
mental duties at the same time. After discussion with Lockwood, 
he requested the AMA to send a doctor for the contraband. In 
early December the AMA showed the letters to President Lincoln, 
and he referred it back to General Wool. 32 Brown then appeared 
before the General and explained the situation to him.33 Wool 
concurred with the need and a physician from New York, Dr. 
Linson, arrived on December 23. 34 This process of securing the 
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backing of many different agents to implement necessary improve-
ments, and redress grievances concerning the care of the contra-
band was the unfortunate result of Lincoln's "policy to have no 
policy." The time it wasted and projects it blocked resulted 
in much suffering among the refugees and frustration with the 
missionaries. 
Many obstacles besides health in the mission's day- t o-day 
activities caused problems for Lockwood's fledgling mission 
foundation. To guard against smuggling, infiltration and 
spying, the army issued passes to move through the lines of 
defense in the occupied areas, to board the ferries, or to 
enter or leave the area by steamer. Lockwood and some of the 
Free Negro teachers held passes but met resistance at check-
points from pro-slavery officers or overzealous sentries. 
Since these passes expired quickly, they also encountered 
resistance when renewing them or acquiring one for a special 
purpose. They also needed passes for nighttime meetings. The 
army inspected all the incoming goods for the contrabands in 
Baltimore, issued passes for them, and shipped them to Fortress 
Monroe. Lockwood had to justify the contents of every shipment 
from the AMA or any other benefactors. The process made i t 
difficult to receive donated goods, wasted much valuable time, 
and many times mis-sent portions of the shipment to the wrong 
person or command. General Wool found that his simple commit-
ment to provide food and medical services to the contraband 
became very complex. 
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Shallow cooperation between Lockwood and the army began to 
erode in the new year. With January's advent the young idealist 
had scored a good beginning for the education of the 800 contra-
bands at and around Old Point Comfort. Unfortunately the army 
command was not in the practical position to aid the contrabands 
much beyond the need for labor. The command structure failed 
to control the prejudices of the soldiers and junior officers, 
and graft and fraud crept into the financial dealings between 
the quartermasters and the contraband laborers. That, the lack 
of a positive policy, a great excess of contraband dependents 
rather than laborers, and the necessity to use all his resources 
for active campaigns seriously dampened General Wool's willing-
ness to aid Lockwood beyond this small beginning. 
To complicate matters in early January the gradual 
disappearance of many workers caused problems. The contraband 
had labored without pay or a clothing issue for many months, and 
began to feel that they fare d better working for themselves, or 
by drifting to another area north. Soon Quartermaster Talmadge 
realized that he was issuing rations to women. children, and 
infirm men without any laborers to "earn" their keep. To force 
more men to work he changed the ration policy. Instead of 
distributing rations at various locations, he made the only 
distribution point the Fortress. This forced many refugees 
to walk three and a half miles for provisions. In addition, he 
cut one third to one half of the people off the ration lists. 35 
Despite the apparent necessity this measure was questionable 
because during the fall he built up a reserve fund of $5,000 from 
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the money that the contrabands should have received.36 Distri-
buting this could have induced the workers to stay. 
When the workers applied to General Wool to receive their 
due, they faced harassment from the proslavery officers issuing 
rations. In one instance, David Billops, a contraband, labored 
for five and a half months on fortifications without receiving 
any money or clothing. He stayed home one day to chop wood and 
on his return to the Fortress asked General Wool when he could 
expect some pay. The General wrote him an order for clothing, 
but the Sergeant in charge put him in the guardhouse because he 
c omplained to "Headquarters." After spending one and a half days 
in the guardhouse Billops again asked General Wool for attention 
to his case, and then received two dollars and a pair of shoes. 
He was one of thirty laborers on the gang at the work site north 
of the Fortress, none of whom received any money or clothing for 
the duration of their labor in the fall and early winter.37 In 
addition to these problems the army confiscated the contraband 
housing at will. One of the contraband, Paul Patrick, who lived 
with his family near the Fortress told Lockwood that an officer 
came to his house and "turned the stove out of doors." He then 
ordered Patrick and his wife, who was sick, to be out of the 
house by nightfall.38 
Lockwood was especially frustrated by the cruel treatment 
of the refugees because the mission schools progressed well and 
he planned to expand more in the spring. Brother Herbert and 
Mrs. Peake's schools showed good progress, and at the beginning 
of January he established a new day and sabbath school at Mill 
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Creek Bridge. He also planned to erect a regular day school with 
quarters for him and his wife near Hampton, and a hospital. He re-
ceived the approval of General Wool and submitted a plan for the 
lumber to Captain Burleigh for the school, and Captain Rufus Brown 
submitted a plan for the hospital. Lockwood notified the AMA that 
he needed 1500 dollars for construction of the school.39 
Looking for solutions to the contrabands' problems, and 
more aid for his expansion, Lockwood wrote and asked the brethern 
to use their influence to help solve some of the problems at the 
Fortress. Through the AMA Lockwood hoped to tap the informal 
antislavery clearinghouse which was his most powerful tool in 
the conflict with the army, He felt the newspaper correspondents 
in Fortress Monroe misrepresented the true facts of the mission 
because they were''Proslavery in sympathy." He asked Jocelyn to 
help "get the true facts of the mission before the daily and weekly 
press." He also asked if Lewis Tappan could use his influence 
with many Congressmen to help solve some of the problems 
directly, and possibly cause the appointment of an investigating 
committee to inspect the contraband affairs at the Fortress. 40 
Operating as a de facto information clearinghouse anti-
slavery organizations published contraband reports on the front 
pages of both "in house" and national newspapers. Some of these 
included the Independent and the New York Herald Tribune, the 
Boston Commonwealth, and the Evangelist, Advocate, and Journal. 
Edward Pierce described his July experiment with the contraband 
in the Atlantic Monthly, and dispelled many images of shiftlessness 
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and indolence of the Negro race. 41 All the societies continually 
disseminated propaganda and factual information on the condition 
and progress of the contraband as a basis for more far-reaching 
progress. In turn this provided the anti-slavery politicians 
with information to use in Congress to argue the passage of 
needed legislation to step up the war effort against the South 
and slavery. The loose organizational advertising structure 
passed on the efforts of the contraband programs from the field 
at Fortress Monroe and other occupied areas to the population of 
the North, and in large part, made the mission efforts responsible 
for swaying conservative public opinion in favor of emancipation 
and reconstruction. 42 This kind of political advertisement was 
valuable to the administration because it influenced possible 
recruits as well as swayed emancipation sentiment. 
Jocelyn, Tappan and the abolitionists in general realized 
the problems that plagued the contrabands. In January John Jay 
urged Senator Charles Sumner to consider the necessity of an 
executive bureau to oversee the problem of the runaway slaves. 
Realizing the overall goal of emancipation for the slaves 
needed a united abolitionist front, the two largest factions 
of the movement made an informal truce of their differences. 43 
Both began to publicly support the goals of emancipation and 
care and protection of the Freedmen instead of criticizing the 
other's methods. Many New England abolitionists also visited 
the Fortress in line with their occupations as steamship 
captains, merchants, or other supporting capacities with the 
..... 
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army and navy. 44 These men reported to their respective organi-
zations by letter and on their return. With the capture of Port 
Royal, South Carolina,and its untouched population of contraband 
on their home plantations, emancipationists shifted their concen-
tration towards the possibilities of experiments using the 
ex-slaves as free labor. At this time, 1500 contrabands lived in 
the Fortress Monroe command, and it too received a fresh look. 
Subsequently, the AMA secretaries took Lockwood's entreaties 
seriously and tried to use their influence on his behalf. 
Unfortunately, before any relief came from the AMA, the 
strained relations with General Wool led to an outright break. 
w·1 1 liam L. Coan, a Massachusetts merchant who had helped an 
ailing Lockwood with labor and donations, wound up a three week 
Visit with the recuperating missionary to go to Boston to report 
to the AMA. Shortly afterward, Lockwood decided to visit 
Philadelphia with a refugee, Mr. Davis, to interest congregations 
in the plight of his mission contrabands. Receiving verbal 
Permission from General wool, he departed in the second week 
of January. Returning a short time later, the quartermaster, 
Captain Talmadge, charged him with trying to "steal" a contra-
band to the north. He curtailed Lockwood's activities by 
forcing him to suspend his prayer meetings at the Fortress. 45 
After much persuasion and influence from Jocelyn and Whipple, 
General Wool agreed to appoint a commission to investigate the 
complete spectrum of problems concerning the contraband in his 
connnand. The commission included Congressmen Wilson and Hale, and 
a Colonel Cannon. They visited Fortress Monroe inFebruaty, listened 
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to Lockwood's grievances, and investigated the overall situation. 
To Lockwood's surprise, the commission supported the rights 
of the contraband, and vindicated the missionary of all charges 
by Quartermaster Talmadge. 46 In their investigation they found 
that Talmadge and some of his friends defrauded the contrabands 
by refusing to pay them and failing to keep adequate records. 
Wool issued a new order directing that the Government pay for 
contraband's labor immediately, and appointed an agent, Charles 
B. Wilder, to attend to the affairs of the contraband. 47 The 
commission also recommended that the mission make arrangements 
for private schools and officially appointed Dr. John P. Linson 
as doctor in charge of the contrabands. 48 
Despite the many difficulties caused by the army's con-
servative contraband policies, the squalid conditions in the 
occupied zone, and the slow awakening of Northern opinion Lock-
wood established a shaky but a dequate foundation for the mission 
in the first year of the war, Through his initiative the Free 
Negroes of Hampton operated two contraband schools, and more 
than one sabbath school; and General Wool's investigatory 
commission committed the army to supplying the needs of the 
contral:ands, and providing somewhat for their future welfare. 
The mission operated as a distribution point for donations from 
northern benefactors to the refugees, and represented the 
rights of the contrabands to the army. In the next spring (1862) 
Lockwood's foundation would be strained to the limit by the 
marshalling of the Peninsula Campaign forces, but after many 
struggles would grow and expand to Norfolk and Portsmouth. 
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Chapter II 
Struggle for Survival 
In the second year of the war, 1862, the development of 
the contraband missions passed through the second and most 
difficult stage. During the Spring months Fortreso Monroe 
served as the supply base for the Peninsula Campaign. The 
mobilization of McClellan's army, changes in quartermaster 
jurisdiction, and added influx of contrabands strained army 
logistics to the limit. As a result the missions underwent 
great tribulations trying to stay afloat much less service 
bulging contraband population. 
In February 1862 General John E. Wool's investigatory 
commission on the condition of the contrabands at Fortress 
Monroe and Hampton appointed the American Missionary Asso-
ciation's agent, Charles B. Wilder, Superintendent of Con-
trabands. In Boston Wilder owned a trading business, Messrs. 
Wilder and Sons. He served the AMA on the Executive Board, 
and as their Boston collection point for donations. 1 With 
his business experience he facilitated the transportation 
of donations to the mission and in January had arrived at 
Fortress Monroe to look into the conditions there as a special 
agent for the Association. Unknown t o Wilder, hi s acceptance of 
the appointment carried the responsibility of mediating con-
flicts between the missionaries, contrabands, and the army 
for the next nine months. 
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Wilder began his new work by trying to implement the 
recommendations of the Commission. He first revised General 
Wool's wage plan suggesting that average unskilled laborers 
receive ten dollars a month, laborers experienced in the use 
of a trade fifteen dollars a month, and women and children 
under eighteen five dollars a month. All catagories also 
included rations and medical aid. Wool approved this plan 
and Wilder proceeded to implement it. In addition he pro-
posed that those refugees not employed by the government 
could cultivate confiscated lands adjoining Hampton under 
the supervision of his office and thereby become self sus-
taining. Having just accepted 80-100 new laborers he wanted 
to use them as a core. The General heartily comm.ended the 
plan and sent Wilder to Secretary of War Stanton to apprise 
him of its details. To the new Superintendent's surprise 
Stanton disclosed that the plan reflected his own views, 
and returned Wilder to Monroe with his sanction. 2 
For the first few weeks of March the mission worked 
in the midst of productivity, even though they were pre-
occupied with the death of their co-worker Mary Peake,3 The 
contraband continued to settle in shacks around Hampton, 
extra space in the cottages of the free negro population, 
and burnt, confiscated homes abandoned by the townspeople. 
Lewis Lockwood, the contraband missionary, spent much of the 
time searching for dwellings and lodgings for new teachers. 
Hampton and the surrounding area had a scarcity of lumber 
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and because of the burning of Hampton, the only nearby town-
ship, lodgings posed a difficult problem. 4 His long range 
plans for the mission included hiring many teachers, expand-
ing Brother Hyde's School and turning their seminary into 
an industrial school.5 
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The Chesapeake Seminary that Lockwood wished to convert into 
an industrial school for the contrabands, and the massing of 
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Unfortunately events of the war intervened to delay the 
initiation of the Lockwood plans for many months. Near the 
end of March Lincoln's "Save the Union" policy again clearly 
showed that reuniting the Union took precedence over the 
problems of the contrabands. He sanctioned General George 
McClellan's, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, plan to 
drive up the :peninsula from a marshalling area at Fortress 
Monroe to try to capture Richmond. 
It was solid strategy for the President because if 
McClellan won the campaign the war would be over and the Union 
preserved, and if he lost Lincoln would have grounds for 
replacing a too popular and very insubordinate General. After 
the stalls and defeats of the Army of the Potomac, the Presi-
dent faced the question of McClellan's competency. He placed 
the responsibility for victory solely in the General 0 s hands 
by providing all the support needed to make the campaign a 
success. In two weeks the army massed over 110,000 men, the 
largest force ever assembled in modern warfare at Fortress 
Monroe. Using the James and York Rivers as supply lines they 
planned to march the eighty-five mile distance uµ the Penin-
sula to Richmond. Having all the support he requested the 
outcome clearly rested in McClellan's hands. 
No matter what the outcome of the campaien, the mission-
aries feared that the army had abandoned them and the refugess. 
Preserving the Union meant that the contrabands would most 
probably have to return to their southern masters. If McClellan 
lost, the marshalling ofa,huge army threatened to disrupt the 
gains that the missions already made in establishing services 
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for the refugees, and dioplace many of the refugees for labor 
necessities and movement of supplies and personnel. 
The events of late March and Apr il did little to dis-
prove Lockwood's unhappy perception that the army intended 
to neglect its contraband charges. On lVIa.rch 11, General Wool, 
at the urging of Dr. Cryler, ordered all the residents of the 
Seminary to vacate it for a hospital for the incoming sol-
diers. Four days later Wool issued another order mandating 
that all the refugees move from Hampton where they worked 
at oystering and in fisheries, and the Seminary grounds near 
the Fortress to a swampy area in back of Mill Creek "for their 
own Protection. 116 To force Lockwood and Lewis H. Hyde, another 
teacher, to leave, Dr. Cryler suggested they leave with the 
other residents to facilitate the evacuation, and return a 
little later. On their return, though, he refused to allow 
them entry. General Wool, frustrated with the problems of 
the missionaries and the contrabands, allowed Lockwood seven 
days to use the seminary to find a place to stay, but he 
refused use of the seminary basement for an industrial school 
at the insistence of Dr. Cryler that the hospital needed it. 7 
These orders forced the contrabands to live in a tent city 
on a swampy exposed ground near the s t ormy mouth of the Chesa-
peake. They left Lockwood without a place to have Sunday ser-
vices and Hyde without a place to hold school. 
During the end of March and beginning of April the 
mission and contraband housing changed continuously. The 
missionaries moved from house to hous e trying to keep the 
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mission on an operational basis. Lockwood strongly considered 
lecturing in the North to expose what he believed to be the 
perfidy of the army's lower echelon officers and to secure 
public support for the contrabands, but he disliked leaving 
the people without a champion. 8 Instead he moved into Brown 
cottage from the seminary, and some of the contrabands stayed 
in President Tyler's mansion and Mallery's house near the 
Fortress even though they had been ordered to leave. 9 Wool 
donated lumber to the contrabands in lieu of wages for them 
to erect their own homes. They reluctantly began to settle 
the area despite their expectation that whether McClellan won 
or lost they must leave Hampton, and probably if he won they 
would be sent back to slavery.10 
The relocation of the missionaries and contrabands 
caused the final split with General Wool. Some of the mis-
sion's friends joined with officers hostile to the contra-
band's interest in the scramble for housing, Capta.in Burleigh 
had to leave the seminary so he joined Dr. Cryler, and tried 
to force the contraband out of Mallery house because he 
wanted to move in. In another instance Captain McKaye, a 
proslavery officer, had one of Lockwood's contraband friends 
who worked part time at the seminary locked up because he 
demanded to be paid.11 The army may well have needed the space 
for the influx of McClellan's army, but the harsh treatment 
of the missionaries and contraband showed that the space 
problem provided an excuse for proslavery personnel to 
38 
harass them. Lockwood appealed to General Wool on every 
account, but the General said he was fed up with school 
teachers and refused to provide quarters for them. As a 
result Lockwood blamed the General for refusing to take cor-
rective measures and became violently anti-army. He suspected 
a conspiracy of collusion on the part of junior officers, and 
passive acquiescence on the part of senior officers to deprive 
the missionaries and the contrabands of their rights. 
Lockwood's uncompromising attitude also caused :problems 
with Wilder. The Superintendent, who was responsible for mov-
ing the contraband to the various places of internment, 
endeavored to maintain some semblance of cooperation between 
General Wool and the AMA in this disturbing time, but was 
increasingly vexed because Locl<:wood continually polarized the 
situation. In addition the latter began auctioning off donated 
goods for the contraband which ended up in the "wrong hands. 111 2 
The rash missionary felt that General Wool disliked him becaune 
he stated before the commission that Wool gave him verbal 
permission to take a contraband north, and later denied it 
which caused his arresto He also charged that the General 
evaded his responsibility to the contraband, and blamed Wool 
for not wanting to help solve the mission problems. 13 The 
sale of contraband goods became the last straw in Superinten-
dent Wilder's d_isillusionment with Lockwood, and he began a 
campaign of letters to the AMA suggesting the latter's 
removal. 
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Wilder was the first of a succession of contraband man-
agers whose duties at Hampton Roads were to successfully 
integrate the services of the army and the benevolent associ-
ations to aid the contrabands. Initially they were A~A people 
franchised and recognized by the army. Later both the army 
and AMA fielded their own superintendents who worked to-
eether.14 These men kept the mission on an even keel during 
this early period. Lockwood performed this service at the be-
ginning of the mission in September 1861, but in the difficult 
time of the Peninsula Campaign, and later in the summer of 
1862, coordination increasingly fell to Wilder. 
As Wilder struggled to protect and care for the contra-
bands and simultaneously accommodate McClellan's army, Lock-
wood continued on his own path. 1-Ie illegally moved into Tyler 
house, vacating it in the rain along with several contrabands 
there and in White cottage as well. 15 He felt that the mis-
sion was in a "floating condition," and realized the useless-
ness of anti-army feelings, so he concentrated on productively 
holding the mission together during this difficult period. 
Lockwood begged the AMA for more support. The parent 
association leaned heavily toward helping Port Royal at this 
time because of its cooperative military, absence from mili-
ary operations, and home-born plantation population. He an-
grily wrote the corresponding secretary that the Fortress 
Illonroe contraband should be a "sample people" who could show 
the gains possible to be made by the black potential to in-
4o 
fluence Northern sentiment for emancipation.16 Niaintaining 
that the many visitors to Fortress Monroe should be shown 
more results, he proposed that efforts on the part of the 
missionaries and the Home office should be increased. He 
asked for more teachers of ''good constitution, sound throat 
and lungs, good singers and good active individuals and 
Christians. 1117 Thinking strategically he requested that they 
send a female teacher from New England to build up interest 
in the Fortress Monroe mission from that valuable area, begin 
women's auxilliaries to inflame interest among women for the 
contraband problems, and send daily and weekly reports to the 
18 major Northern religious newspapers. 
In spite of their problems and differences Lockwood and 
Wilder worked together to further the programs of the mission. 
On April 17 they discussed plans to use the partially burnt 
Hampton courthouse as a combined school and church. General 
Wool reluctantly gave them the lumber, and the AWIA provided 
the money needed for the windows, doors, and roof. They began 
renovations19and near the end of the month, even though the 
building fell short of being ready for use, the mission's 
first teacher, Charles P. Day, arrived. Being a New England 
principal with vast primary school experience, Day began to 
help establish another class immediately. 20 
By the end of April the mission had gained some relief 
from the two month plague of mishaps. Much of the great mili-
tary force moved thirty miles up the peninsula to the siege at 
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Yorktown and on IJiay 4 McClellan entered the city. 21 Two days 
later President Lincoln, Secretary of the Treasury Samuel P. 
Chase, and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton arrived at For-
tress Monroe. Lincoln personally planned a pincer movement 
against the Twin Cities and saw Norfolk and Portsmouth 
surrendered without a battle on May 10, 1862. 22 The Federals 
moved out of Hampton and Fortress Monroe to occupy Norfolk 
and Portsmouth, and Lockwood and Wilder gained space to oper-
ate, many new faces to teach, and great hopes for further 
expansion. 
Two weeks after the dust settled, LoC'l{wood realized that 
Norfolk and Portsmouth harbored very strong secessionist 
feelings. He wrote the Association offering to take possess-
ion of the new field for the AMA, and spent two weeks trying 
to get a pass to enter Norfolk. But when he entered the city 
on May 24, all four of the churches he visited reproved him. 
The pastors of both the colored and white churches held 
equally pro-slavery sentiments and one even owned a large 
number of slaves •· 23 With his hopes for expansion of the mis-
sion seriously dimmed Lockwood wrote to Whipple with vehe-
mence, "God will make them willing in the day of His power, 
or break them to pieces like a potter's vessel and bring His 
people out with a high hand and outstretched a.rms. 11 24 
The Twin Cities action gave the Union much needed vic-
tory in McClellan's devastated campaign, but it concealed the 
actual condition of the contrabands and the army's conflict 
with the missionaries. The President and his secretaries 
actually visited the Fortress to supervise the destruction 
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of the Merrimac, The capture of Norfolk and Portsmouth just 
added the knowledge that another scourge like it would never 
be built with access to the Capital. Unfortunately these two 
victories shifted emphasis away from the problems of the con-
trabands. That, the milder weather, the pullout of the army, 
and the rapid construction of the schoolhouse temporarily 
submerged the problem of army cooperation with the mission, 
The contrabands still had much to fear from the ambigui-
ties of federal policy,· McClellan continued inching up the 
peninsula and in a few weeks expected to be in Richmond, and 
the President changed the command at Fortress Monroe, Appar-
ently General Wool, a Presidential appointment, not directly 
responsible to McClellan refused to send McClellan troops to 
use in the Peninsula Campaign. Lincoln switched him with the 
slightly pro-slavery General Dix, who immediately sent ten 
divisions to McClellan, The politically minded general from 
the Pennsylvania command, 25followed administration directives 
to the letter. The President knew that if necessary the com-
mand in occupied Hampton Roads could assume a conservative 
stance on slavery without any special written orders. General 
Dix's inclinations sufficed to acquiesce to the needs and wants 
of the rebel population in the absence of policy to the con-
trary. 
The new General felt much more pro-slavery than General 
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Wool. Through his Pennsylvania command which included Balti-
more and the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia , he 
successfully led the pro-slavery population back into the 
Union without bloodshed. 26 He used an open policy of maintain-
ing the status quo of slavery and rebuilding the economy of 
that region. He was one of the few commanders in occupied 
areas that returned escaped slaves to their owners, and 
barred them from refuge behind Union lines. Even after a 
resolution passed the House of Representatives encouraging 
Union officers to avoid enforcing the Fugitive slave law, 
General Dix pursued a slave he believed hiding in Annapolis 
in his camp. 27 He had saved the Eastern Shore for the Union, 
and intended to do the same with Norfolk and Portsmouth. 
Superintendent Wilder showed justifiable concern soon 
after Dix took control. He realized that the General held 
very little actual power and felt indisposed to help the 
contrabands. The Portsmouth reign of terror continued through 
June, and spread to Hampton, Camp Hamilton, and Fortress Mon-
roe.28 Refugees poured into the area in "droves of twenty to 
one hundred." They were so brutally treated that Wilder spent 
most of his time just reporting crimes against them. 
The Superintendent spent so much time arbitrating claims 
that he had to neglect the farm community plan to resettle 
the contrabands. 29 Without a feasible relocation plan the 
refugees dispersed throughout the area on their own cogni-
zance.JOThey were easy prey for the soldiers who needed little 
.. 
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excuse to rob, murder, rape, or kidnap and then melt into the 
anonymity of thousands of blue uniforras. 
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from General In June, 1862 the Fortress Monroe Command changed 
John E. Wool (left) to Major General John A. Dix. 
confusion of a new command continued to stall the 
during the summer. 
The resulting 
mission progress 
The possibilities of any positive action from Fortress 
li'Ionroe to alleviate the suffering of the contrabands seemed 
slim. General McClelland commanded the QuartermaGter Depart-
ment which regulated the rations, housing, pay, clothing 
allowances, and protection for the contrabands. If he wished 
to make any changes or in-depth investigations General Dix 
needed the approval of the staunchly conservative r-.1cClellan 
and also the War Department. Wilder wrote to Whipple in June 
urging him to use political pressttre in ~·!ashington to help 
solve the problems. He suggested combining the forces to the 
Llassachusetts Senators Sumner and ~•Jilc;on and others, the New 
.. 
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York, Boston and Philadelphia Freedmen associations, the AMA, 
General Wool, and Colonel Cannon t o force changes through the 
War Department in Washington. 
In response to Wilder's entreaties Whipple visited Hamp-
ton Roads early in June. He spoke to General Dix, but achieved 
little. The General verbally took a non-active middle ground 
stance on the problems. He agreed to issue the workers the 
pay due them, but presented no plan to do so. He failed to 
make permanent regulations governing the conduct of the sol-
diers and the freedmen, and refused to promise to protect 
them from kidnapping, or crimes against the large family 
groups in Camp Hamilton and Hampton.31whipple wrote to Jocelyn 
on June 11, 1862 that his interview with General Dix was 
ine on.elusive, and that he must stay "if not rebuffed" to 
try to initiate some working in the situation. He also added 
that if he failed to solve the problems at Monroe then he 
"must go to Washington. 11 32 
An additional problem at the mission was still the strong 
idealism of Lewis Lockwood. In a touch and go situation such 
as Wilder faced with Dix, Lockwood often behaved with great 
indiscretion.33 He indiscriminately attacked the Unionists 
and se.cessionist residents and the army if they were possi-
bly of proslavery sympathies. He exercised very little care 
with the Association's funds and the goods received for the 
benefit of the contrabands. He lacked the sagacity to keep 
statistics on the kind and value of the goods received for 
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the contrabands, and records of the recipients of these 
goods.34 Lockwood found it difficult to adapt to a systematic, 
organized, patient struggle to expand the mission°s base a.nd 
functions. On June 12 Wilder wrote to the brethren that Lock-
wood's abuse of the charities "are working great injury to us 
and your association wherever it is known." On June 20 he 
notified them of a petition by the people of Hampton and the 
Fortress to General Dix to remove Lockwood from the area .• 35 
Even though Lockwood's accusa.tions aggravated the deli-
cate situation they accurately pinpointed the worst contra-
band problem in the new command. Junior officers with pro-
slavery sympathies took advantage of the confusion of the 
Peninsula Campaign and the command change to harass the con-
trabands, and General Dix refused to take any action to recti-
fy the situation. Wilder spent most of his time at Headquarters 
trying to mitigate the abuses against the contrabands, and no 
one seemed disposed,including the AMA,to take overt measures 
to prosecute the villains.36 Lockwood felt too much concern 
for the plight of the contrabands, and wounded ego as their 
champion to realize that an outward attack on President Lin-
coln's new General may do more harm than good. 
Despite Lockwood's shortcomings Whipple realized that 
the continuing limited success of the mission grew out of his 
efforts, and that the contraband also knew this and looked to 
the young missionary as their champion. The work of the mis-
sion continued as regularly as possible and on June 2, 1862 
a bright spot flickered as the mission realized some success. 
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The old Hampton Court House was dedicated as the new mission 
school and church. Charles P. Day took occupancy with his 
class that previously had been meeting in the Old Woods Mill 
just north of the Fortress, and separated them into a primary 
and an advanced section~ The schoolhouse was a milestone for 
the mission because it represented a permanent foundation for 
Af:IA cornmi tment to the education of the contraband, and sym-
bolized the hardships that both the contraband and the mission-
aries underwent to complete its construction. Lockwood was 
elated, and it provided visible encouragement to the contra-
band who still were very skeptical of the Union's intentions 
regarding their rights. Since the contraband identified edu-
cation with freedom the efforts of the mission to give them 
education reinforced their expectation of freedom. Lockwood 
survived as the only leader the contrabands believed in. 
At the end of June, the idea of expansion of the mission 
schools in Hampton or to Norfolk or Portsmouth appeared highly 
unlikely. Since Norfolk and Portsmouth sentiment was highly 
"se cesh", Dix's conservative :policy necessitated playing down 
any aid to the contrabands that might contribute to their 
freedom. The expansion of schools into these cities fell into 
that category. In this context it is not surprising that Gen-
eral Veile, direct commander of the Twin Cities, refused to 
allow the missions to expand the schools to Norfolk and 
Portsmouth on the pretext of fearing a riot. His being a new 
commander just appointed by Chase added to his timidity, and 
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he also refused to allow city elections of local officials.37 
Instead he placed the cities under a provost marshall. Viele 
may not have calculatedly initiated these orders to support a. 
conservative policy but they remained consistent with the new 
attitude of placating the southern people in the occupied 
areas under Dix's command.38 
The corresponding secretary visited Hampton again on 
July 8, 1862 to make a greater effort to affect some compro-
mise, and to help get the mission on a day to day basis of 
caring for the contrabands needs, educating,and resettling 
them. After a month and a half in command Whipple found Dix 
more relaxed and confident. The General seemed disposed to do 
all that his power allowed him to do, but Whipple still sup-
posed that if Dix's power failed to achieve the necessary 
goals then he would go to Washington. 39 The secretary remained 
in Hampton for over one month discussing with General Dix 
various aspects of the contraband problems. He wanted the 
government to pay the contrabands for the 20,000 to 30,000 
dollars in work they completed for the army, and to pay the 
Superintendent of the Contraband's a salary with quarters. He 
requested rooms and usual privileges for educational purposeG, 
reasonabl-e protection for the contrabands, and free transpor-
tation and shipping privileges for the Superintendent. In 
addition Quartermaster Talmadge had removed records and 
accounts of the contrabands work, pay, rations, etc., when 
the command changed hands, and Whipple requested that they be 
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returned in order to assess a proper picture of the payments 
0 ed to tl t b d f th . d . t . 40 w 1e con ra ans rom e spring an win er previous. 
As the month progressed General Dix became increasingly 
difficult to contact. The secretary waited over two days be-
fore the general could allow him an interview. At that time 
Whipple asked for passes for two new teachers, J. Porter 
Green, and his wife Mary, and informed Dix that many of his 
orders were being evaded. For instance, an order to erect a 
building for the women and children contrabands only compelled 
the Quartermaster to send a man to oversee the construction 
of the building without the necessary workers, materials, and 
a refusal of any, from that Quartermaster. Dix promised a new 
written order for the building's construction, and telegraphed 
Baltimore to allow the Greens permission to come to the For-
tress.41 Three days later Whipple tried to follow up that 
interview, but General Dix's orderly asked the secretary to 
write up a statement of his needs. The next day when the 
statement was ready, Dix was unavailable for interviews. 42 
Whipple could not wait for another interview, and when Dix 
returned the secretary was already in New York. 43 
Again during his visit at the Fortress Whipple tried to 
relieve Lockwood who felt despondent over the failure to make 
any concrete gains to aid the contraband~condition. After 
many suggestions he recommended that Lockwood take a month's 
vacation. 44 While waiting for clearance to leave Lockwood 
visited Norfolk, and experienced a tremendous emotional wel-
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come from the black population there. "I was completely 
thronged--two of the col'd men clas ped me in their arms, and 
men and women strove for the first shake of the hand. 1145 The 
young missionary returned double determined to help solve 
their problems, and wrote to Jocelyn that they needed to have 
"a missionary and teacher constantly engaged with them." 
Denied clearance to go north he renewed his efforts to open 
schools in Norfolk and Portsmouth. Veile consented grudgingly 
to open a school in tents near the navy hospital a mile east 
of Portsmouth, but a definite refusal to open schools in Nor-
folk.46 When Whipple returned at the end of July the secretary 
was gratified by the progress Lockwood made and also happy 
that he stood by him. 47 Strangely Lockwood's limited success 
previewed Whipple's new tactics. 
Being wary of possible Federal policy changes after the 
Campaign, the AMA secretary followed a policy of waiting and 
discussing local level problems with General ijix throughout 
the early summer. In July Lincoln's policies began to change 
under fire from the Radical Republicans and urging from Secre-
tary of War Stanton. Congress passed the second Confiscation 
Act which became law on July 17, under Lincoln's signature. 
It authorized freedom for slaves already in custody, and 
encouraged the use of ex-slaves for the overthrow of the 
rebels. 48 Stanton felt that the slaves should be used as a 
military weapon to defeat the South. 49 In terms of goals he 
"was in complete sympathy" with the Radicals.50 The second 
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Confiscation Act provided a lawful tool that Stanton and the 
Radicals could use to persuade the President to use Negroes 
as troops. Immediately after the signing Stanton encouraged 
Lincoln to allow General Hunter the liberty of arming negro 
troops. On July 22, Lincoln read his preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation to the cabinet.51 
The possible issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation 
completely changed Whipple and Dix's strateey. It meant a 
relaxation of the push for the rights of the contraband to 
encourage voters in the border states and occupied areas 
to vote in November elections, According to the proposal all 
the slaves in the non voting se.ceded states would be declared 
free. In New York Whipple apparently received word to tone 
down the association's demands for contraband riehts until 
after the November elections, and Dix received word from 
Stanton to stop pushing obvious help to the contraband at 
Hampton Roads to avoid inflaming the local white population 
against the plan. 
On their return both Whipple and Dix changed their tac-
tics. Dix who had been negotiating with Whipple directly 
referred him to deal with the quartermasters in authority 
over the contraband. Instead of persistently dogging Dix with 
the problems of junior officers in his command, he concen-
trated on making as many unobtrusive gains for the welfare 
of the freedmen as possible, 
Whipple stayed almost two weeks, waiting for Dix to set 
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up a meeting with Quartermaster Talmadge. During that time 
the contra.band barbarities continued and the army began 
impressments again. 52 Lockwood went north for a vacation, 
and General Dix took limited action to stop some of the im-
pressments illegally carried out by officers from Newport 
News in collusion with officers at Fortress Monroe.53 
Though he was ill, and taking a chance on malaria by staying 
during August in the absence of Lockwood and Wilder, Whipple 
remained almost until Wilder's return to carry the mission 
through this shakey period. 
The most obvious indication that the AMA joined the army 
to reduce the clamor for contraband rights lies in Wilder's 
interaction with Whipple and Dix during August. Wilder left 
for Boston before Whipple got back to Monroe early in the 
month and therefore remained unaware of Whipple's new direc-
tion. In Boston he secured promise of endorsement from 
influential people on a petition to the Secretary of War 
about the problems at Monroe. Both Charles Sumner and Gover-
nor Andrew promised to sign, but strangely Whipple avoided 
taking advantage of it. 
When Wilder arrived at Monroe he wrote Whipple to dr aw 
up the petition as soon as possible but the secretary con-
tinued to drag his feet on the issue. Dix who coincidentally 
returned from Washington on the same boat as Wilder mentioned 
to Wilder that "he could not always do as he would", that he 
wanted to get all of the contrabands off Point Comfort, but 
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that the Quartermasters wanted to get them out of his control 
altogether. He also mentioned that the old lumber that he gave 
the contrabands to build a building for the women and chil dren 
satisfied his responsibility in that matter, and avoided a.ny 
more conversation. 54 Three days later on August 26 he refused 
to write a ration order for Wilder, but added that if the con-
trabands could not get rations without the order he "would 
assist".55 In keeping with the new policy Dix was understand-
ably reluctant to write orders for rations, but his offer to 
"assist" indicates that he was in favor of giving the contra-
bands food. 
In New York Whipple still avoided preparing a petition 
for Wilder even after Wilder reported that he received posi-
tive endorsements from Sumner and Andrew, and an even more 
brutal impressment of the contrabands by McClellan' s army. 56 
Both Whipple and Dix re fused to consider inflammatory changes 
or aid to the contraband that could serve as evidence for 
successionists who could sabotage Lincoln's plan. At the same 
time they sanctioned as many unobtrusive efforts on the behalf 
of the contrabands as possible. 57 
In late August Whipple publicly supported Dix. He 
published an account of the rape and impressments that 
happened while he wa.s in Fortress Monroe, and blame d the 
violations on the perfidy and rascality of officers subordi-
nate to the General. He maintained that they were too numer-
ous and evasive to be controlled without very tight s traight-
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forward policy by the army. In the letter he absolved Dix of 
all blame and gave him credit for endeavoring to punish the 
officers who were transcending justice.58 In this way he 
avoided haranguing the authorities responsible for making 
Lincoln's plan work, but at the same time if Dix allowed the 
depredations to continue past November or a reasonable length 
of time, Whipple could then charge him with incompentency or 
silently aiding and abetting the proslavery officers. In 
effect, Whipple stopped pushing for gains in late August, 
but set up for a push in November which he knew would come 
after elections in the occupied areas. 
During this period the mission schools more than held 
their own but expansion ground to a halt. Charles P. Day's 
school in Hampton ran very smoothly with an average daily 
attendance of about 200 "ranging in age from six to thirty". 
He wrote further of the academic progress in spite of the 
carnage of impressments, etc. "There are many pupils here who 
now read in primary reading fluently and correctly, ••• who 
two months ago did not know their A.B.C's. 11 59 Lockwood's pro-
gress in getting permission for Brother Cook to teach the 
contrabands quartered near Portsmouth dissappeared when those 
contrabands were relocated at Fort Norfolk. 60 Brother Cook 
went with them to teach, but only temporarily because Fort 
Horfolk was a temporary stopover. Also Veile refused to an-
swer a petition by the black inhabitants of Portsmouth for 
sabbath schools. The new policy obviously shelved the question 
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of expansion to Norfolk and Portsmouth. 
The month of September necessitated taking care of the 
numerous details that attended the opening of the Camp Ham-
ilton and Hampton schools. On August 15, Whipple had written 
Jocelyn to cut Lockwood's vacation as short as possible be-
th . . d d h. 61 L cause emission nee e im. ockwood returned on September 
8, but he was so disillusioned at the "deplorable condition 
of the contraband camp" that he requested a transfer to the 
South Carolina Missions. 
The political stall ended after national elections in 
1Jovember and before occupied area elections in December. 
IJlcClellan became increasingly insubordinate during September 
and October, and public opinion swung toward emancipation as a 
war necessity. In the congressional elections of early Novem-
ber the Republicans lost Ohio. Illinois, Indiana, New York, 
and Pennsylvania and split in Wisonsin. The Democrats in-
creased their "representation in Congress from 44 to 75. 1163 
After the elections Lincoln dismissed McClellan who had 
publicly rebuked him for issuing the Preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation. In addition Lincoln directed Secretary of the 
Uavy, Gi.de on Welles, to relax the blockade around Norfolk and 
.i:;ortsmouth in response to General Dix's entreaties for some 
relief for the economically depressed area. 64 
Wilder quickly took advantage of the shift in public 
sentiment. An editorial appeared in the New York Tribune 
on November 12 that chareed Dix with neglecting the safety 
and well-being of a group of contrabands assigned temporarily 
to an old barn for quarters. 65 A few days later the Superin-
tendent presented Dix with a. petition consisting of nine 
claims that heard the Ar/IA requested the government grant in 
favor of the contrabands. On November 18, the New York Tribune 
published a letter from Wilder in defense of the General say-
ing that in actuality the army cared for the contrabands to 
the greatest extent of their means, and that the barn served 
as only temporary shelter because they just arrived. 66 Dix, 
who doubtless aloo felt the change in public sentiment and 
relief from the lessening of the blockade, realized the power 
of the public press and appreciated Wilder's defense. The 
next day Wilder reported to the brethren at the AMA that "I 
am making good headway with Dix. In presenting our claims to 
him, he promises all he can give and will send me to Secretary 
Stanton for the balance. 1167 
December events capped the shift of emphasis toward 
the contrabands. In the elections that finally took place 
early in the month in the 2nd Congressional district, 
including Norfolk and Portsmouth, the voter turnout was much 
less than the prewar totals. Norfolk showed 23% its 1860 
total, while Portsmouth with a larger pro-Union following 
showed 53% of the 1860 turnout. 68 The results showed a 
greater number of Unionists than the other occupied areas, 
but not enough for state representation. Most of the slaves 
in the south were obviously subject to Emancipation. 
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Teachers that Wilder requested in October began arriving 
at the mission. Palmer Litts, and Thomas Tucker arrived to 
help an ailing VIr. Day with his schoo1. 69 Dix moved a large 
body of the contrabands from Newport Hews to Craney Island, 
just at the mouth of the Elizabeth River between Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, and William O. King arrived with Tucker to teach 
them on the island. J\t the end of the month John Oliver who 
taught the contrabands at Newport Iiews, but left in September 
because of the difficult conditions, convinced General Veile 
to allow him to open schools in Portsmouth at the invitation of 
the Black church congregations there. 70 
In the rush of Emancipation many opportunities began to 
open. The nevv'ly formed Emancipation Leagile moved to lay a 
foundation for a central agency to deal with the problems 
of the slaves about to be emancipated. Samuel Gridley Howe 
suggested that "we must be able to present as early as poss i-
ble, a general and reliable coup d'oeil of the actual condition 
of those who are actually out of the house of bondage; their 
wants and compacities. We must collect facts and use them as 
amrnuni tion." The League sent out questionnaires to "super-
visors and superintendents of the contrabands." They received 
prompt positive replies from eight superintendents which 
stressed that the freedmen showed a capability to learn as 
quiclcly as "comparable classes of white people", and that a 
temporary guardianship during a transition period would 
facilitate their change from slavery to freedom.71 Later in the 
.. 
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month J. Miller McKim visited Sumner, Congressman J ohn Bingham, 
and Stanton to urge that an inquiry commission be formed to 
investigate the situation of the contrabands. All the men 
favored the idea although Stanton urged caution.7 2 As the month 
ended they and the whole Union waited to see if Lincoln would 
withstand the conservative factions of the country and issue 
the Proclamation without modification. 
New Year's Day, 1863 began with a celebration by the 
contrabands and free Negroes in the streets of Norfolk. 73 
When President Lincoln announced the Emancipation Proclamation 
in Washington, 5,000 strong were waiming in Norfolk for the 
wireless message of the announcement. They greeted it with a 
tr.emendous expression of freedom and happiness. 74 Unfortu-
nately the Proclamation exempted occupied Virginia and other 
small areas "for the present," but the contrabands, as did 
many abolitionists, felt that it would apply at Hampton Roads 
in time. 75 
After the long year of mission struggle the missionari es , 
superintendents, and contrabands reaped their reward. Even 
though Lincoln exempted the Hampton Roads area from 
emancipation, the Proclamation created a demand for many 
"experiments" to determine the best method of resettling 
and educati:mthe contrabands. Th~ :Hampton.Rnads area was 
ideally suited to ~egin projects of this nature. The mission 
expanded into resettlement programs, and the schools expanded 
into Portsmouth during the first month of the year. For the 
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army Doctor Orlando Brown, a surgeon with the 18th Massachu-
setts Volunteers, accompanied the Newport News contrabands 
to Craney Island to help alleviate the suffering conditions. 
He directed a. staff of about sixty workers to help guard the 
island, provision and feed the people, take care of the sick 
and bury the dead. 76 With a philosophy of "help them help 
themselves" he divided the population into squads with appo inted 
leaders. He directed them to take responsibility for the order-
lineSs~nd cleanliness of their respective grou~s, and as soon 
as the planting season began sent them out to plant gardens 
on the island.77 In Hampton Wilder began the mission's long 
neglected plan to settle confiscated lands, and looked for-
ward to a productive spring. 
John Oliver moved to open Portsmouth schools. He spoke to 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, and received use of the church 
basement. 78 On January 26, in the midst of a large celebra-
tion, he connnenced school with 130 children to mark a mile-
stone in the long struggle of the mission. By the middle of 
February the school grew to include more than 172 children, 
and at the end of the month two more teachers arrived to 
help. 
The August and November decisions by Whipple and Wilder 
to support General Dix obviously reaped a successful harvest. 
The political General totally changed with the shift of 
Administration policy. In early spring he ordered the army to 
con:fiscate several rebel plantations and to turn them over t o 
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the contrabands for "occupancy under suitable regulations". 
The "farming implements, teams, seeds, etc." came from the 
Government in part, but mostly from the New York and Boston 
Freedmen's Association. Dr. Brown began planting on Craney 
Island and expanded to nearby plantations, and Wilder report ed 
that instead of ten or twelve plantations they would need 
more than fifty before the season finished. He expected to 
grow "cotton, sweet and Irish potatoes, corn, and garden 
vegetables", and a.t the end of the season to have a large 
surplus of cotton and sweet potatoes. 79 
The enthusiastic acceptance of the schools in Portsmouth 
almost guaranteed that the mission could duplicate the ex-
periment in Norfolk. On March 26 Wilder received approval 
from General Dix to begin schools there. The African Methodist 
Church made available two or three rooms for the contrabands 
to use as a church and schoolhouse, but the Norfolk public 
remained hostile and teaching there necessitated cons t ant 
contact with Government officials for protection. Wilder 
asked Jocelyn and Whipple for someone who could deal with 
these problems on a day to day basis, but before an answer 
arrived the Confederate army attacked Suffolk, twenty miles 
westo Resulting military action forced many travel and secur-
ity restrictions on the Twin Ci ties area. and stopped school 
expansion. Three weeks later, Thomas Tucker, a teacher with 
Day's school, decided to try to begin a Norfolk school in-
spite of the danger, and received much popular support from 
the black population there. 80 Wilder doubted that Tucker 
could make the school succeed under the many restrictions, 
and again asked Jocelyn to send someone to take charge. 
The AMA sent Reverend George N. Green, an experienced 
missionary, to investieate the possibilities of a Norfolk 
school. He arrived on April 18, 1863 and began to organize 
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the schools immediately. Speaking to Tucker and Day at Hamp-
ton he learned of the strong contraband and free Negro support 
and available rooms. In Portsmouth Greely and Henry s. Beals 
told him of the educational enthusiasm of their students 
and advised him to begin with at least three teachers. 81 
Green received Miss Pitts, a newly arrived teacher, as his 
assistant, and planned to open a day school at the Bute Stree t 
I'ilethodist Church and a Sunday School in the African Methodist 
Church. Finally on Nlay 6 he opened the school with 350 pupils, 
in the day and JOO in the evening. Green used four assistants, 
but quickly asked for two more female teachers stating, 
"Harvest is plenty, laborers are few. 1182 
After the much halted progress during the Peninsula 
Campaign and the change of command, and the political stall 
for the last half of 1862, the Emancipation Proclamation pave d 
the way for rapid mission development. The expansion to Nor-
folk and Portsmouth marked a new era for the contrabands. 
Wilder expected a great influx of teachers and missionaries, 
contrabands, and an overall school organizer during the sum-
mer. With the need to develop succinct models for the location 
and acculturation of the mass of emancipated slaves he tried 
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to mobilize organization and resources as qu ickly as possible. 
Little did he realize that the tremendous rise in t he number 
of refugees would severely tax the capability of the AlV!A, 
force very tight cooperation with the army, shift program 
emphasis to Orlando Brown and the new AMA organizer in the more 
urban Twin Cities, and preview the way for the formation of 
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CHAPTER III 
Development of the Blueprint 
In late spring of 1863 Norfolk was a dirty, overcrowded 
city. Hundreds of refugees and poverty-stricken whites 
crowded the streets. "Wharves, streets and sidewalks" were 
battered and in need of repair. General Naglee's Medical 
director reported in August that local diseases could be 
prevented only by putting the cities "immediately into a 
sanitary condition."1 War casualties included the street 
lighting system, the fire department and most of the bridges. 
White poor lined up for federal relief daily and secessionist 
bankers planned to remove local deposits to Richmond. 
For the next year and a half the army and the mission-
aries developed the contraband schools in Norfolk and Ports-
mouth and surrounding farms into a school system destined to 
be the blueprint for the Virginia State Freedmen's Bureau 
schools. The opening of the Norfolk city missionary schools 
set the stage for the beginning of this development. The 
farm labor experiments "presented most of the essential 
features needed" to help the freedmen gain self sufficiency 
and provided a setting for the development of the Twin 
Ci ties education system·~2 As the necessary subsistence pro-
grams for the contrabands they enabled the schools to develop 
with a fairly stable student population which was one of the 
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main ingredients of the system; The farms received the main 
emphasis from the army and the AMA. The two programs developed 
congruently but the school system hitch-hiked on the develop-
ment of the farms because subsistence programs demanded 
priority. The farms failed to become an important Reconstruc-
tion program because President Johnson's Amnesty Proclama-
tion of 1865 returned most of the confiscated lands to their 
respective confederate owners: 
Despite the city's deplorable conditions the contrabands 
enthusiastically attended the new missionary schools. After 
three days of classes more than one thousand students 
strained the facilities of the school: Reverend George Green, 
head teacher in Norfolk, was a missionary rather than a 
teacher or supervisor. Both he and his teachers realized 
they needed a superintendent to oversee the student popula-
tion. On May 12 a teacher wrote to the secretaries of the 
AMA, "We need a superintendent of the whole. Mr. Green does 
not expect to or intend to confine himself to it." Late in 
the month Captain Wilder wrote the AMA to send a competent 
man or the schools would suffer. 3 Anticipating the need for 
a coordinator for the schools' opening in the two cities, 
Whipple had been looking for the right person for months: 
In June he sent William H. Woodbury to Norfolk as Supervisor. 
Woodbury, a professor of German and Primary Education 
from Holyoke,Massachusetts, realized the problems demanded 
radical, and in some cases, delicate solutions. The refugees 
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needed to be housed, clothed, fed, schooled, and employed. 
In the past the Army often refused to put a priority on the 
problems of the refugees~ Woodbury knew he needed to keep 
the cooperation of General John Dix and local commanders to 
give them necessary logistic support to employ, house and 
feed 12,000 people:4 The missionary teachers also presented 
problems; Many of the preachers tried to halfway fill in as 
teachers. Some capable teachers were doing supervisory jobs 
that wasted their teaching skills. To complicate the problem 
new teachers needed to possess the ability to communicate 
effectively with the ex-slaves in the way that the preachers 
did~ Woodbury wanted to keep the missionaries who communi-
cated well with the people but taught poorly, but at the 
same time needed capable men and women to teach. He suspected 
that the situation demanded a large shakeup of mission per-
Instead of trying to solve this problem, the new super-
intendent concentrated on cooperating with Dr; Brown because 
he understood that developing a strong working relationship 
with Brown provided the key to AMA-Army coordination; The 
military provided buildings and rations for the teachers' 
homes, schools and subsistence, as well as the contrabands' 
homes and subsistence, and its need for labor and increas-
ing number of refugees continually overloaded or depleted 
the school population~ The summer campaigns produced a 
severe shortage of manpower in the army.5 On June 22 Secre-
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tary of War Edwin Stanton ordered the recruitment of colored 
troops at Norfolk, 6 and soon after the Army tried to raise 
1,000 men by collecting them after church without allowing 
them to go home. As a result the refugees avoided regularly 
scheduled activities such as school and church, and many 
hid in the fields not far from the camps. 7 When Woodbury 
first arrived in June, the c ity of Portsmouth overflowed 
with refugees from the military action in Suffolk. Brown, 
with a small staff, welcomed Woodbury's assistance processing 
the new refugees. 
In t ur n ,Captain Brown wished to cooperate with Woodbury. 
Regarding the impressment, Captain Brown wrote to Jocelyn, 
"I think it very unfortunate to be compelled to impress them 
as it creates distrust that should if possible be avoided." 8 
Brown realized that the AMA needed a capable person to handle 
the mission personnel, administrate the mushrooming schools 
in the iwin Cities, and continue smooth relations with the 
army. Throughout the spring Brown asked Whipple for someone 
capable of cooperating with the Army.9 
Whipple sent Woodbury ma.inly to fulfill an administra-
tive and diplomatic function. Helping Brown to locate the 
still great influx of new refugees around Portsmouth gave the 
new superintendent an over-view of the problems of the refu-
gees in the overcrowded cities, and allowed him to observe 
the workings of the school system and scrutinize the mission 
personnel unobtrusively. In early July Woodbury went back 
to New York to plan the coming year with Whipple and to 
prepare to move his family and belongings to Norfolk. 
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Both Brown and Charles Wilder, superintendent of the 
contraband at Fort Monroe, felt charity was damaging to the 
refugees, and endeavored to develop a reliable method for 
the contrabands to use to support themselves. 10 As early as 
1862 Wilder received permission from General Wool and Sec-
retary of War Stanton to allow the refugees to settle on 
abandoned lands. Stanton hoped this type of experiment would 
solve the refugee problem. 11 In the spring General John Dix 
issued confiscation orders for abandoned plantations and 
those of disloyal southerners for Brown and Wilder to use 
to establish refugee families on small parcels two to ten 
acres in size. In a central section he located unattached 
Negroes ·and used them in labor gangs. They were fed and paid 
when the crop came in·. The tenants signed contracts for one 
year with terms depending on the soil quality and buildings 
on the plots.12 
The farm programs showed tremendous success. The govern-
ment provided necessary tools, teams and seeds on loan until 
the crops were harvested and the dues paid. It also loaned 
subsistence supplies instead of rations with a lien on the 
crops. In addition to corn and sweet potatoes, the new 
farmers produced milk and lumber. Brown's supervisors visited 
the farms regularly and lived on some of them. The schools 
closely followed as itinerant teachers visited the farms and 
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dispensed relief supplies among the farmers regardless of 
the danger from confederate guerillas. In late spring the 
military removed their forces from Suffolk twenty miles west 
to a line directly through the farms. This reduced the size 
of the available land and brought the war much closer to 
the inhabitants. Despite this, by August, Brown reported that 
903 people occupied places on the farms. 13 
These experiments produced a great impact on efforts to 
help the refugee by influencing the American Freedmen's In-
quiry Commission (AFIC). At the suggestion of Charles Sumner 
and the radical leaders of Congress, Edwin Stanton established 
the AFIC in March, 186J "to investigate the condition of the 
colored population emancipated by acts of Congress and the 
President's proclamation of January 1, 186J, and to report 
what measures will best contribute to their protection and 
14 improvement, so that they may defend and support themselves." 
Samuel Gridley Howe, Colonel James McKaye, and Robert Dale 
Owen, all friends of Charles Sumner, constituted the Commis-
sion. They visited Virginia and many other contraband loca-
tions in the South, and received testimony from the superin-
tendents in each area. In June of 186J the Commission issued 
a report which agreed with the farm policies of Brown and 
the education policies of the AMA, and encouraged further 
development. The Commission recommended that contraband 
camps serve only as collection and distribution points for 
the incoming refugees on the way to farm settlement, and that 
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education was vital to long-term planning of the integration of 
the freedmen into. society. The commissioners recommended 
systematic division of the contraband population under 
capable superintendents and steps for immediate provision 
of carefully administered school facilities. 15 
As the summer progressed, the contrabands themselves 
reinforced the findings of the Commission. Letters of the 
missionaries showed that their charges wanted more teachers. 
The teachers did the work among the people themselves. They 
taught them and their children in school, and visited them 
to encourage them to come to school and to do their homework. 
They distributed clothing and sometimes rations and medicine 
to them to enable them to come to school. After the July 6 
impressment with half the black population gone or scattered 
in the woods, Charles P. Day wrote that the only way to over-
come the people's mistrus t was "by a missionary effort from 
door to door. 1116 In addition the contraband's own preachers 
also doubled as community leaders so the congregations natur-
ally felt some antipathy toward missionaries who preached a 
different philosophy of life. They had suffered under white 
preachers appointed by their owners in slavery, and wanted 
to hear their own leaders. 17 On August 8, Reverend Steven 
Bell, a preaching missionary and recent arrival in Hampton, 
wrote to Jocelyn, "As to preaching, they seem to prefer their 
own colored ministers to us. 1118 A week later, he wrote again, 
"The work of teaching will be the work among this people for 
some time. 1119 
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During the last two months of summer, events began to 
change the character of the mission. The July impressment 
made the contrabands wary of the missionaries, and a zealous 
thirst for education caused them to obviously favor the 
teachers. The Norfolk school success led to infighting among 
the missionaries and in late July Green experienced a rebel-
lion of his monitors who wanted monetary payment per week 
instead of rations and housing. A week later the congregation 
of the Bute Street Baptist Church rebuked him for approving 
the ordination of an unpopular minister for their congrega-
tion. Green lost support from the people and had to agree 
to allow a black minister, Brother Henderson, to lead the 
congregation where he previously held support~20 
In Hampton the missionaries began arguing among them-
selves. Brother James P. Stone and the other residents of 
the teachers' home asked the AMA secretaries to remove Mrs. 
Williams. Coan, the housekeeper. She was the wife of one 
of the Norfolk teachers, the second most experienced mission-
ary in Hampton~ The group charged that her management of 
the household affairs wasted too much money, and that she 
treated the black people with reproach. Whipple and Jocelyn 
were skeptical, but reluctantly removed her from the position. 
Stone, a pioneer missionary who could not teach effectively, 
realized that he must consolidate his administrative author-
ity to balance the growing lack of support for non•teachers. 21 
In September Professor Woodbury returned to prepare the 
opening of the schools. He began by requesting qualified 
teachers instead of churchmen. On September 7 he wrote 
Jocelyn asking for a woman to replace Miss R. G. Patton 
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at the orphanage at Ferry's Point. He wanted "an educated 
woman who can read and write and spell correctly, and who can 
listen patiently, speak calmly and quietly and decidedly, 
and express her mind in clear intelligible English. 1122 His 
wife, Louisa A. Woodbury, also wrote Whipple that "music and 
inspiration" were the most successful qualities for a teacher. 
She stressed that teachers must possess energy and zest for 
activity to inspire their pupils "who are passive until acted 
upon~· 112.'.3 
Fortunately, Reverend George Green, like most of the 
other teachers, had gone home for the summer vacation. Wood-
bury capitalized on this to help rearrange the personnel. He 
wrote Whipple and asked him to place Green in a non-teaching 
field.·24 He depended on William s. Coan to continue as a 
head teacher in Norfolk, H. S~ Beals and Jonathan Greely in 
Portsmouth, and Charles P.· Day in Hampton. In the cases of 
Reverend Green and other preachers that he wanted to dismiss, 
he sent Whipple the information and let the latter make the 
decision. 
In a controversial decision the new AMA Superintendent 
chose to concentrate on the Norfolk missions. Technically 
Woodbury supervised the schools in Norfolk, Portsmouth, 
Hampton, and Yorktown, and on September 9 Captain Wilder 
78 
charged that with this decision Woodbury failed to fulfill 
all of his duties. He wrote the AMA that the Norfolk schools 
advanced rapidly, but Portsmouth and Hampton schools lagged 
behind;25 Woodbury, on the other hand, felt Norfolk consti-
tuted the most important work. The Portsmouth schools re-
mained closed because of a late summer vacation, and the 
supervision of Yorktown demanded thirty miles of land and 
water travel. In Hampton, James P. Stone considered himself 
the AMA superintendent, and the Baptist congregation charged 
that Mr. Day favored the white children. 26 With a rebellious 
leader in Hampton, a major congregational problem, and 
Mr. Day's school progressing well in spite of it, Woodbury 
thought it best not to interfere, and concentrate on Norfolk 
instead: The city s chools opened during the months of October 
and November, and the new superintendent spent the f irs t of 
these months supplying and administering them. 
On November 2, 1863 the experiments at Norfolk received 
national support~ President Lincoln appointed General Benja-
min F. Butler Commander of the Department of Virginia and 
North Carolina. The man who in 1861 refUsed missionaries 
from the AMA for the contrabands by 1863 had becom~ too rad-






Benjamin Butler assumed 
command of the Department 
of Virginia and North 
Carolina on November 4, 
186J. 
In January Lincoln relieved a very un_happy Butler from 
the Louisiana command, and conditions developed that led 
the new radical to Virginia. In November of 186; the Radical 
Republicans needed a constitutional amendment to solidify 
the Emancipation Proclamation. The General led the cause for 
radical Congressional reconstruction along with Sumner, Bout-
well, Davis and Whiting. 28 Apparently the Radicals wanted to 
invest Butler as the Commander of the Department of Virginia 
and North Carolina to help develop a blueprint for the solu-
tion of the Negro question to help support the 13th Amend-
ment. Earlier in 1863 Francis C. Bird originator of the 
"Bird Club," the caucus organization for Massachusetts Rad-
icals, visited the farm experiments in the area, declared 
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that they "seemed to lay the foundation for an industrious 
and self-supporting peasantry," and gave the plan his enthu-
siastic support. 29 Both Butler and Sunmer enjoyed confiden-
tial membership in the "Bird Club, 1130 and doubtless heard 
the report from Bird. 
Butler wanted a command with political potential, and 
after Gettysburg and Vicksburg reconstruction was the fore-
most political subject. Lincoln, although he dispossessed 
Butler of the Department of the Gulf, actually favored him 
as a capable administrator.31 Feeling Senate pressure to 
appoint Butler to a post, and needing a cooperative liberal 
administrator in Virginia, along with the possibility of 
developing a solution to the refugee problem the President 
easily saw the November 2nd appointment as the ideal solu-
tion~ 
Butler warmed to the idea of providing a plan for the 
problem of "what to do with the ex-slave." Recent military 
victories at Chattanooga and Vicksburg cleared the Missi-
ssippi Valley and split the Confederacy: With the possibility 
of the war ending and new masses of slaves in Union hands, 
the question of reconstruction became the major issue in 
Congress. The Department of Virginia and North Carolina 
held no prospect of military action, and only little glory 
from successful prisoner exchange. 32 The General whole-
heartedly supported the AFIC recommendations to expand to the 
farms to find a permanent solution to the Negro problem. 
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The preparation for sweeping changes in the Norfolk 
experiment began in September. Brown and Woodbury suspected 
that Butler might come as Commander of the Department one 
month early and began to prepare for his arrival. General 
Barnes, a long time friend of Butler, replaced General Naglee 
as Commander of Norfolk,33 and on October 17 Woodbury wrote 
Whipple that his time consisted of many extensive discussions 
with General Barnes on a matter which he must not reveal 
until November 4, 1863.34 On October 13 the War Department 
promoted Surgeon Brown to the rank of Captain and Assistant 
Quartermaster of Volunteers.35 In this position he could 
control the payments for the contraband, and requisition 
supplies for the farms himself rather than using the regular 
army quartermaster. Moreover Woodbury wrote Whipple asking 
for six new overseers to manage farms.36 
On November 3, 1863, s. c. Pomeroy, a Congressman from 
Ohio, wrote Butler that the President wanted to appoint him 
Commander of the 1st Department of Virginia and North Caro-
lina "if he would accept." He urged Butler to accept because 
the post possessed advantages "in a political sense. 1137 
Realizing this Butler had already accepted the command before 
Pomeroy's letter. The appointment came the same day, and he 
prepared to travel to Norfolk. 
Unlike Dix, Butler came prepared to deal with the contra-
band problem. His experience in Louisiana, a thorough 
briefing on the current conditions at Monroe, and an accurate 
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knowledge of the problem nationwide gave him ample fuel to 
prepare a cohesive program. Despite the radical General's 
reputation Woodbury underestimated his intentions. On Decem-
ber 2 the professor requested black teachers from Whipple 
to help "make his race the occupant and ultimate owner of 
the broad acres of the South.·11 38 A week later he asked the 
Secretary to come to Norfolk to help influence Butler's 
cooperation, but the following day General Order #46 detailed 
a comprehensive new plan of reconstruction for the contra-
bands; To Woodbury's happy surprise Butler came prepared to 
deal with the refugees' problems. 
General Order #46 precisely followed the recommendations 
of the AFIC. It separated the Virginia-North Carolina Depart-
ment into three areas. Captain Wilder supervised the area 
north of the James River; Captain Orlando Brown controlled 
the area south of the James River in Virginia; and Reverend 
Horace James directed the District of North Carolina. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Josiah Burnham Kinsman, a long time adjutant 
of General Butler's, accepted the detail of the general super-
intendency of the Department. The orders provided specific 
rules for the enlistment of colored soldiers with pay and 
subsistence for their families, promptness of payment for 
labor including back money owed to the contrabands, regula-
tions against idleness and impressment for private profit, 
and active aid to refugees trying to escape Confederate 
territory-. The superintendent's duties included protecting 
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Historian Tinsley L. Spraggins illustrates the three contraband 
areas that General Order# 46 created . in a map from his artic le , 
"Mobilization of Negro Labor for the Department of Verginia and 
North Carolina." The farms in Area II, Orlando Brown's jurisdic-. 
tion, extended north, west, and south from the city limits of 
~orts~outh, and north ,east, and south from the city limits of 
Nor.folk. 
• 
the refugee - ,population, providing food, shelter, clothing, 
medicine, and employment including contracts. Furthermore, 
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the orders specifically protected and aided the missionaries. 39 
The order attracted national response. Robert Dale 
Owen wrote on behalf of Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe and the 
American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission that the order "will 
contribute more than any other similar document issued since 
the commencement of the war to the solution of one of the 
hardest problems • : •1140 Regarding the order, Butler wrote 
to Lewis Tappan in New York, "I trust it will be the frame-
work around which free colored labor may be organized in the 
future~"41 
Butler's support brought changes to the AMA organization. 
During the fall, Woodbury had formed a new attitude toward 
the contrabands' education. He agreed with Brown that they 
needed more guidance in the practical necessities of life. 42 
When Butler put his weight behind settling the farms, the 
professor felt he needed to expand his function as AMA 
superintendent along those lines. On December 9 he asked 
Whipple to release him from service because Brown offered 
him a position with greater opportunity to organize the farms. 
Three days later he wrote again that he accepted the position 
with Captain Brown as overall superintendent of the City of 
Norfolk, but decided to remain in his AMA function until 
Whipple found someone to fill his post, and recommended 
William L: Coan for the posi tion·.·43 
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The Superintendent realized that a tight city system 
and good city leadership constituted the essential ingre-
dients of a foundation for movement out to the farms.· The 
city system of schools provided the headquarters and supply 
depot for the farms, and the farm settlements hinted at the 
possibility of solving a national problem. Woodbury wrote, 
"Given the soil, with the schools, meeting houses and mar-
kets, and you have the solution of the problem "what to do 
with the negrol"44 To lighten his mission responsibilities 
he determined to place the city mission "on such a basis as 
will require the least possible outside superintendency." 
The new expansion as with all phases of the contraband 
connnunity•s development began with many obstacles. W. L. 
Coan was dissatisfied with his position: He became so estranged 
from Woodbury that the latter could no longer recommend him 
to take over the mission work·: Brown moved Coan to Portsmouth 
and the superintendent temporarily took over supervision of 
both teacher houses in Norfolk. During the month of January 
the two co-workers became increasingly distant; Coan charged 
Woodbury with tampering with his mail and asked the AMA to 
direct it straight to Portsmouth.·45 He refused a commission 
from Brown, who unknown to Coan reneged on it after talking 
with Whipple. 46 
Coan accepted the AMA superintendency of Portsmouth, 
but refused to accept any direction from Woodbury, the overall 
Superintendent.47 Brown and Whipple worked together to solve 
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the problem.· On February 15 Brown defined Woodbury's duties 
as the General Superintendent of Norfolk and Portsmouth, 
while Whipple made Coan the supervisor of all the primary 
schools under AMA authority. If Woodbury needed Coan's 
acquieroence on a major issue he contacted Whipple who ordered 
Coan to comply with the superintendent. With this system 
Coan was independent, but not enough to cause problems 
with major policies. 
In accordance with AFIC recommendations, as the farms 
expanded, Brown separated his area into districts and appointed 
assistant superintendents~ He needed someone to work personally 
with the farms and people in the area to find out what land 
was abandoned and which residents were in the rebel army or 
had family in the army. With this information, Brown began 
proceedings to confiscate the land for Department use. In 
addition the assistant supervisors helped locate the refugees, 
supervised the overseers, procured implements for farm use 
and drafted contracts. 
Brown also needed a supervisor to develop the lumber 
business that became strong on the farms during the winter 
and spring. A good amount of land had stands of white oak 
and pine, which Brown planned to clear for farming. One farm 
included a sawmill, and all the others possessed access to 
the rivers~ Moving the uncut lumber to the sawmill and then 
distributing it to the cities by barge eliminated the use 
of horses and wagons that the army needed at the front. The 
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mill supplied the Navy yard, the schools, the other Quarter-
master Departments, local buyers, and the farms themselves 
in an ever-increasing volume. Early in the summer of 1864 the 
Army alone requested 100,000 feet for building purposes. 48 
During that spring and the next summer the farm system expanded 
rapidly·.· 
Problems continued arising throughout the spring months. 
The doublebladed plows that the previous owners left on the 
:farms required a strong man to operate ·: With mostly women 
and young boys to cultivate the refugee corn crop, Thomas 
Jackson, a Subdistrict Superintendent, requested sixty-six 
single blade plows for all his :farms, but the Quartermaster 
Department refused to supply an item different from their 
regular inventory. Jackson wasted over a month of plowing 
time trying to secure them through channels. 49 In spite of 
problems such as this, the corn crop yielded enough for the 
needs of the farms and more to offer for sale. Since corn 
was the staple food for the poor people, there was a large 
market for what the refugees produced.· 
The farm schools followed the progress of the community 
expansion. Late in February General Butler suggested that 
Brown place the most experienced teachers on the farms 
to begin the schools on a sound footing even though the farms 
were not quite ready.SO Problems developed because of the 
condition of the refugees and farms. H. s. Beals, who began 
and operated a successful multi-graded school in Portsmouth, 
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moved to Taylor Farm where seven hundred refugees waited for 
his arrival on April 1. They had suffered a high mortality 
rate from living in a c ommon room in Norfolk, where t hey 
contracted diseases such as fever, measles, small pox, 
dysentery and whooping cough. On the farm half the buildings 
needed finishing, so the refugees were little better off.51 
Mr. Beals possessed excellent qualities for school leader-
ship but lacked the business acumen to run a farm.52 
The teachers who filled the old guards' places sometimes 
failed to keep up the high quality of instruction. Some new 
candidates went straight to farms and bent under the weight 
of the undertaking. Gradually· students dropped off and lost 
enthusiasm but the city and farm school populations increased 
as refugees continually arrived. 
Brown ' s se t tlement system became more organized as the 
contraband populations swelled and Woodbury's school system 
kept pace. In April the Twin Cities held fourteen classes in 
various churches and unused public school buildings. Grades 
ranged from low primary (ignorant of the alphabet) to 
advanced (reading the New Testament).53 The students pro-
gressed rapidly, but sometimes necessitated a sound disci-
plinary policy of neck-twisting, choking, arm pinching or 
use of the rod. The teachers lived mainly in three mission 
houses--two in Norfolk and one in Portsmouth.54 
As the growing, efficient refugee experiment began to 
receive national interest, the last stage in development of 
89 
a blueprint for the schools began to take shape. Recognizing 
a fertile area for proselytization, many societies began to 
apply for permission to teach the refugees in the area. 
Butler forwarded these to Brown. Moreover some city congre-
gations demanded teachers of their denomination, contacted 
appropriate societies and pressured both Brown and Woodbury 
for their admittance. Both superintendents recognized that 
denominational competition threatened the experiment with 
mcrei;roolans. Since the AMA had sole authorization from the 
War Department to operate in the Hampton Roads area, Brown 
refused the other societies, but at the same time asked 
Whipple to sponsor individual teachers to stave off conflict. 
Denominational strife actually began two years before 
the success of the farm experiments. The American Missionary 
Association informally represented both the Congregationalists 
and the Free Will Baptists. The first missionary in 1861, 
Lewis C. Lockwood, was Baptist. He communicated with the 
refugees easily because most of the contrabands embraced the 
more emotional aspects of religion as Baptists rather than 
the strict, reserved demeanor of the Congregationalists. Still, 
a large gap existed between him and the congregation in his 
vicinity; , He made progress with the religious life of the 
people very slowly. After nine long months he could only 
report that he had just succeeded in winning their confi-
dence.55 In September, 1862, he transferred to South Carolina 
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and his successor, James P. Stone, began experiencing prob-
lems also: 
In the two years that elapsed between Lockwood leaving 
Hampton and Green coming to Norfolk, many problems arose 
because the Hampton Baptist congregation demanded someone of 
their denomination as a missionary. The news easily spread 
to Norfolk so when Green established schools, even though 
the native congregation invited him, they only allowed him 
to lead the congregation because he brought the schools 
with him. In the summer Woodbury began supervising the schools 
and removed all the missionary preachers. Still, the Baptist 
congregation asked him for Baptist teachers because they 
believed that the teachers favored children of their own 
denomination~56 
Woodbury recognized that the potential for confusion 
and competition among benevolent societies in Norfolk and 
Portsmouth was much greater than in Hampton. In 1863 the 
Baptist denomination began the American Baptist Home Mission 
Society: Reverend Theodore Parker, agent for the society, 
visited Woodbury in Norfolk and arranged to send Baptist 
teachers to the city through AMA sponsorship. The AMA 
declined to pressure individual teachers to report to the 
AMA Superintendent on a day to day basis so the success of 
the arrangements depended solely on the individuals involved, 
Susan A, Walker, of the Baptist Home Missionary Association, 
successfully operated one of the two AMA mission houses in 
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Norfolk and received pay from both societies;57 Reverend 
Jolm Abbey, though, a member of a different organization, 
took over a farm in Hampton and became involved in a scandal 
with his female teachers~ In such a case as this the AMA 
removed their sponsorship.58 
During the year the emergence of many national relief 
organizations made the use of technical AMA sponsorship 
unwieldy, and the different societies slowly crept into the 
area~59 They included the Pennsylvania Freedmen's Relief 
Association, the National Freedmen's Relief Association, 
the New England Freedmen's Aid Society, the Philadelphia 
Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association, and the Baptist 
Home Mission Society: One teacher came, established a school 
and sent for others. They came, established more schools, and 
changed the curriculum to inculcate their own views~ The 
government soon provided more than fifty teachers with food, 
fuel and quarters~ 
Without a system the students moved from one school to 
another and then only attended irregularly: Captain Brown 
suggested to Colonel Josiah B~ Kinsman, the Director of the 
Department of Negro Affairs, that he appoint an overall super-
visor and sanction some plan to prevent the problems~ Kinsman 
left the appointment up to Brown who persuaded Woodbury to 
finally leave the AMA and superintend all the societies' 
efforts in the area~60 The professor, as well as his mentor, 
felt responsible for finding a working system; 
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In the summer of 1864 Woodbury, in his new function, 
went on an extended trip north to arrange a conference 
between himself, Brown, and the various associations to 
discuss a system for multi-society schools in Norfolk. They 
felt that since the government partially supported the teachers 
it should be able to control the organization. The superin-
tendent wanted to use teachers from other societies in the 
system without allowing them too much power to cause con-
flicts. Woodbury emphasized to Whipple in several letters 
that he should come. 61 He also invited George Hawkins of the 
National Freedmen's Relief Association. 
Possibly Brown and Woodbury gerrymandered the conference 
representation to re t ain the majority decision. The other 
associations either failed to receive notification or refused 
to come except for the New England Relief Association (NERA). 
Brown asked their only teacher in Norfolk, Hamma Stevenson, 
whom to invite as a representative. She answered that she was 
the agent for her society, but he refused to recognize her as 
the official agent for her society. Brown apologized to her 
for not believing her when the NERA failed to send another 
62 representative, but conveniently after the conference. 
With just George Hawkins to negotiate against Whipple, Brown 
and Woodbury, the resulting agreement reflected the latter's 
goals. 
The conference created the blueprint for the Norfolk 
and Portsmouth schools. A superintending committee consisting 
I 
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of Brown and Woodbury controlled the missionary efforts in 
the city. Approved by Butler in General Order #30, the com-
mittee decided on all matters relating to the acceptance or 
discharge of teachers, the "custody and repair of school 
houses, and all other appertaining to the education of the 
colored children." Their duties included selecting teachers 
from applicants of the various freedmen's relief societies, 
and furnishing fuel, housing and rations to them. The orders 
charged them with creating districts of an equal number of 
scholars within the cities, and arranging for the societies 
to provide the necessary number of teachers. 63 
Woodbury immediately began to use a system of districts to prevent 
competition among the benevolent societies. He began to crganize the 
nuJ.ti-society system of schools in ~arly fall. On the 28th of. Sep-
tember, he wrote Whipple and requested that the Secretary 
invite the other associations into the agreement of the con-
ference with him and Hawkins as their representatives. Wood-
bury also requested that the Secretary send an agent to take 
over the AMA affairs he :lbnnerly served. On Brown's approval 
he published General Order #JO in the Independent, initiated 
a census, and split the cities into districts. 64 
Unable to place teachers on the farms because of the 
high incidence of malaria in the country, Woodbury concen-
trated on the city system. He expanded the teachers• homes 
from two to four. 65 Since the AMA supported most of the 
teachers,separating the districts according to one society 
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for each district was unrealistic. Instead, Woodbury 
insti'tuted three sections, two in Norfolk and one in Ports-
mouth.66 The new AMA superintendent, H. C. Percy, and Rev-
erend Nathan Coleman, from the National Freedmen's Relief 
Association, supervised the two sections in Norfolk, 67 
and Reverend Steven Bell of the AMA directed the effort in 
Portsmouth. 68 
The schools moved smoothly. Percy opened them in Novem-
ber with eight schools and nine teachers. These only held an 
average attendance of 362 pupils, but his night school added 
500 more. Early in the month Percy reported that the districts, 
with graded schools, were a "great advantage to teachers 
and scholars." He estimated that they could handle 500 more 
pupils under that system. 69 
The schools progressed well through the end of the year. 
In early 1865 General Butler left command of the Department, 
the war ended, and Co.nges:; finally provided for a Freedmen's 
Bureau. Captain Brown became a Colonel and Assistant Com-
missioner of the Bureau for the state of Virginia, and 
William H. Woodbury, soon to be succeeded by Ralza Morse 
Manly, became the Virginia Superintendent of Education for 
the Bureau. 
In the summer ofl865 President Andrew Johnson issued 
the Amnesty Pr.oclamation that returned most of the confis-
cated land to the original confederate owners. The farm 
experiment evolved into the contract labor system, and the 
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freedmen became tenants and contract workers rather than 
semi-independent farmers. The Norfolk blueprint survived 
the reconstruction charges at the end of the war and became 
a total success in the Freedmen's Bureau. Under Orlando 
Brown's direction, Manly instituted it on a state-wide 
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Chapter IV 
Implementing the Blueprint 
In March 1865 Congress created the Bureau of Freedmen 
Retugees and Abandoned Lands to acculturate and protect 
the newly liberated slaves. Many changes affected the 
missionaries and contraband since the first Virginia mis-
sion in 1861. In Virginia, Assistant Commissioner Brown 
brought to his new position the experience of supervising 
a multisociety system of schools in Norfolk and Portsmouth. 
The Twin Cities model was simply the separation of an area 
into districts supervised by subordinates, but it was a 
proven system to begin the foundation for statewide schools. 
Instead of a pioneer missionary society, the AMA found 
itself in the midst of several strong benevolent societies 
determined to slice a share of the market of Freedmen's 
souls. Each one maintained a separate structure of agents, 
inspectors, head teachers, assistants, school houses, 
supplies, and local contracts. In the 1864-65 school year, 
250 teachers in Virginia operated solely through the efforts 
of the societies. 1 
Applying a districted system to organize the efforts 
of many benevolent societies in one city or state was a 
simple concept. The occupying army and the Bureau both 
used district organization, but implementing the Twin Cities 
102 
blueprint demanded the cooperation of many competing factions, 
juggling of scarcely available resources, and the stabiliza-
tion of a statewide student population. Orlando Brown 
brought with him the experience and authority to deal with 
the benevolent societies but his overall responsibility as 
Assistan-t;·· Corrµnissioner of the· Burea1,1 in Yi~ginia ·precluded 
him from directly using his experience on a day to day basis. 
Woodbury, the first appointed Superintendent of Education, 
early had to retire to the North to take care of personal 
business. Subsequently, the difficult task of implementing 
the blueprint fell to Woodbury's assistant, Ralza M. Manly, 
an unknown bereft of extensive experience with the districting 
system. 
Attaining a position of authority with the associations 
was a difficult1ask. The superintendency was potentially 
a weak rather than a strong position. In spite of Brown's 
and Woodbury's three year experience in Norfolk, the Bureau 
was an interloper in the mission societies' field of labor. 
Jealous of their own prerogatives and programs, the societies 
assumed responsibility for only their part of the system and 
responded primarily to their sources of income rather than 
the Bureau. In addition, many strong members in the societies 
officiated in the Bureau as district superintendents, inspec-
tors, and agents, many with more field experience than Manly. 
Ralza M. lVIanly was a Methodist Episcopal minister in 
1863. 2 He served as principal of the Troy Conference Academy 
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in Poultney, Vermont, and of the New Hampshire Conference 
Seminary in Northfield, New Hampshire, both of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church.3 He joined the United States First Colored 
Cavalry on December 22, 1863 and one month later, on January 14, 
1864, the Company Commander and field officers elected him 
Chaplain. 4 He served diligently at Fortress Monroe and the 
surrounding area for the rest of the war, and worked as a 
head teacher of a night school with his wife and daughter 
in late 1864. 
When the Freedmen's Bureau began its work in Virginia 
in May, 1865, Manly sought a transfer from his regiment to 
a Bureau position in some educational capacity.5 On May 18 
he requested a twenty day leave of absence to move his family 
from New Hampshire to Vermont. 6 Using his vacation time 
shrewdly, Manly visited Washington with a note from Assis-
tant Commissioner Brown to inquire about his appointment 
with the Bureau. General Howard's adjutant recommended that 
he make an immediate application and push it through channels 
as quickly as possible. 7 He complied, and on June 10, 1865, 
the War Department ordered him to report for duty to Brown 
as soon as possible. 8 
Filling the state superintendency posed a problem for 
Brown. He needed a person he trusted, and one whom the 
benevolent societies respected because they both submitted 
to his authority and paid his salary. Brown nominated 
Woodbury, and General Otis o. Howard, Commissioner of the 
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Bureau, approved his appointment on June 16. On the same 
day Brown received a letter from the National Freedmen's 
Relief Association refusing to pay the salary of "a general 
superintendent picked by the Commissioner. 119 After committing 
the position to Woodbury (who was in the North on private 
business), and possessing no provision for money for the 
Superintendent's salary, Brown decided to use Chaplain Manly 
to run the Office of Superintendent with his authority and 
Woodbury's advice. 
When the Bureau entered into the societies' educational 
"sphere of influence" in the summer of 1865, it was obvious 
that only a good system and strong superintendent could 
solve the many problems. The five main societies all wished 
to proselytize the same southeast section of the state, 
because one-eighth of the Negro population resided in the 
urban areas of Norfolk, Fortress Monroe, Petersburg, and 
Richmond. 10 This produced a high population density that 
enabled the societies to reach a large number of people with 
one or two school houses, and just a few teachers in each 
city. One-half of all the Virginia teachers and pupils 
were concentrated in this area. Richmond with five percent 
of the population held twenty-five percent of the schools. 11 
In addition, the military concentrated their forces at these 
four points. They furnished protection for the teachers and 
students from belligerent Virginians, 12 and provided housing 
for teachers and schools in the homes of loyal Unionists, 
unused military buildings or confiscated structures. 
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Every society shared a desire to educate the freedmen, 
but none wanted the others to gain a better portion of the 
spiritual market. 1J The NFRA partioipatad in Richmond and 
Norfolk, and the AMA taught in Richmond, Norfolk , Hampton, 
Portsmouth and Fortress Monroe. The American Baptist Home 
Mission Society (BHMS) supported schools in Lynchburg and 
they, along with the Pennsylvania Friends of the Freedmen's 
Aid Society (PFFAS) and the New England Freedmen's Aid Soci-
14 
ety (NEFAS), wanted to extend their schools into other areas, 
Each missionary society looked for the most advantageous area. 
The associations understood little of the Bureau 0 s role 
and intent concerning their work. 15 They only accepted the 
idea of an organizer because of the obvious efficiency of 
an impartial coordinator, 16 Also, as the official agent of 
the government, the Bureau represented a channel to revenue 
received from the sale of abandoned and confiscated lands and 
the benefits of the military occupation. The societies wanted 
to know whether Howard planned to supply transportation, rations, 
housing, or school buildings, whether they kept the prerogative 
to direct their own spiritual activities in or around, or in 
conjunction with their schools, or even whether the freedmen 
possessed a free choice of religion. 17 
From the outset the benevolent societies competed vora-
ciously. At the beginning of the summer the societies refused 
to decide on a field to work, Each wanted more time to solidify 
its occupancy and each waited for the other to make the first 
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move. They all coveted part of Richmond. It contained such 
a large population in a small area, any one society dominating 
it held a large advantage over the others. Reverend W. L. 
Coan, the supervisor of the AMA schools, tried but failed to 
organize the associations in Richmond in early June. 18 He 
also experienced many problems with the military authorities 
which he referred to as "copperheads," and advised Whipple to 
concentrate on Norfolk and Hampton. 19 Two weeks later, General 
Alfred Terry, a friend of Colonel Brown, took over the military 
authority of the city, and Whipple along with the rest of the 
societies' officers waited to see how his demeanor and that of 
the Bureau would affect the Richmond field. 20 
In Hampton the AMA hoped to make good a bid for sole 
control of the area by furnishing teachers for the large gov-
ernment school there. 21 In early June Brown gave them a confi-
dential commitment to allow them to take possession of it. He 
said that General o. o. Howard planned to make a general appli-
cation for all the government property in that area, and in 
two or three weeks the Bureau could allow them to run the 
school. 22 Reverend E. Knowlton, however, suspected that the 
principal, Charles P. Raymond, wanted to retain possession of 
the school under auspices of the Bureau. In that case the AMA, 
which taught all the schools in Hampton from 1861 to 1865, 
would lose the possible use of the 600 pupil school house. 
This, and the detrimental effects of Raymond's "experiment" 
on his former pupils, prompted him to push Howard for posses-
sion of the property. 
lW 
Charles A. Raymond, the principal of the school, pre-
sented a good argument to Howard for retention of the schoo1, 23 
and General Butler supported him. Howard decided to wait until 
after the vacation to turn the property over to the AMA. 
Knowlton balked at the decision, but having faith in Brown's 
integrity he finally agreed after the latter reassured him on 
Howard's behalf. 24 Still, after failing to obtain further 
entrenchment in Hampton, the AMA waited during July for the 
Bureau to make the next move. 
The Bureau's first effort to organize the societies met 
with failure. In early July Brown directed Professor Woodbury 
to call a representative from each society to attend a confer-
ence on July 20, where they could divide the field of labor 
amicably. 25 The AMA opposed a free discussion which might 
require r evealing their goal of control of the Hampton-Norfolk 
area. The Secretary of the NFRA, Reverend William George 
Hawkins, wrote Brown that the field entailed a large enough 
area to accommodate all the individual efforts without a con-
ference.26 The NEFAS supported the idea, but lacked the 
opportunity to send a delegate, 27 and the BHMS failed to reply 
to the invitation. The Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Friends 
of the Freedmen's Aid Society were the only associations that 
favored the idea and planned to participate, 28 but they repre-
sented a .minority of the associations, Brown cancelled the 
conference. 
The failure of the conference left the Bureau's infant 
educational effort in confusion. The Brown, Woodbury and Manly 
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combination lacked the authority and means to administer the 
field without adequate input and cooperation from the societies. 
Business progressed very slowly within the office because Manly 
and Brown often found it necessary to consult Woodbury by mail 
for a concensus. 29 Even the practical aspects of the Bureau 
support lacked cohesiveness. Manly held authorization through 
Brown to provide transportation for teachers from their homes 
in the North to the field and to repair buildings already in 
use, but he operated with very meager resources. President 
Andrew Johnson declared amnesty in early June for most of the 
land owners, so Manly's usable revenue from the sale of confis-
cated lands never materialized. In some cases he used help 
from the military in the form of rations for the teachers, but 
only on a very limited and unpredictable basis. Brown and 
Woodbury even held slightly different ideas about the function 
of the Bureau in relation to the societies. Brown knew Howard 
wished them to superintend the activities of the societies and 
to make all the preparations for the coming year during the 
summer,30 but Woodbury dissented, feeling the Bureau existed 
to aid and support the societies in whatever direction the 
latter deemed best.31 
In late July of 1865 the process of organizing the edu-
cation field made it obvious that the superintendency needed a 
firmer policy with more independent authority than Brown, 
Woodbury, or Manly previously anticipated, Brown's intention 
of aiding the societies lay in assuming the burden of organiz i ng 
the total effort, and then providing the necessary practical 
1~ 
necessities available to help the system.32 Unfortunately 
the relief associations owned their individual school net-
works and favored that prerogative too much to release control 
of their work.JJ They firmly established this position by 
refusing to attend Brown's conference and pay the salary of 
the state superintendent. In the face of this, the main task 
for a new superintendent became impressing upon the societies 
that they and the freedmen profited by the Bureau's coordina-
tion. 
Out of necessity Manly gradually became Acting Super-
intendent. Manly became Acting Superintendent only by proving 
his worth through the summer. When he originally began work 
as Assistant Superintendent in mid-June, Brown sought an experi-
enced, salaried superintendent. For the month of July Manly 
served simply as a communication link between Brown, Woodbury 
and the officers of the benevolent societies. As late as 
August 17 the Corresponding Secretary of the NFRA, Reverend 
William George Hawkins, felt obliged to question Manly's 
position of authority in the Bureau.34 Manly notified Hawkins 
that he held the position of Assistant Superintendent, and in 
doing so realized that he needed to take the reins of the 
superintendency more actively to demand cooperation from 
the societies. 
The added aspect of impartiality of the superintendency 
placed Manly in a prime position to assume the Acting Super-
intendency in the absense of Woodbury. The line of authority 
and decision in the Bureau passed from Howard to Brown. Since 
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the latter held direct responsibility from Howard, he needed 
a loyal, autonomous superintendent. Woodbury failed to meet 
these qualifications because of his previous AMA connections. 
The other societies expected him to make concessions to the 
AMA and wanted the same treatment. In addition, private 
business demanded his presence in the North, and he still 
held the position without a salary. Manly, as a Chaplain of 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, drew salary from the Government, 
and belonged to a non-sectarian congregation with few teachers 
in Virginia. He willingly conformed to Army chain of command 
procedures, and his creed considered loyalty to the Union al-
most sacred.35 What Manly lacked in missionary experience 
served to his benefit rather than his detriment. 
In the two months of August and September, Woodbury 
gradually left all the duties of the superintendency to Manly. 36 
He had to stay in the North, so it was necessary to post com-
munications between him and his home office. The necessity 
for speed in solving the societies' problems before autumn, 
and the lack of a thorough knowledge of the problems because 
of his isolation, made it increasingly impossible for Woodbury 
to perform his function even in crucial matters requiring his 
experience. Subsequently, by mid-August Woodbury referred 
everything he received to Manly except materials that dealt 
exclusively with the AMA. 
The problem that tested and proved Manly's ability to 
coordinate the benevolent associations materialized in August. 
The AMA and the NFRA refused to consolidate their teachers in 
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Richmond and Norfolk. The Congregationalists held almost sole 
control over Norfolk-Hampton, with some schools still in 
Richmond, while the NFRA provided teachers in both Norfolk 
and Richmond.J? Manly wanted to consolidate the different 
societies' efforts in the Freedmen's Bureau districts, 38 in 
the same manner Woodbury and Brown districted Norfolk in 1864. 
Since the Bureau was an Army function part of the basic organi-
zation separated the state into districts. Manly gave the 
Butler property to the AMA in line with Brown's commitment to 
allow them to have all of the Norfolk-Hampton field. In this 
regard he also negotiated with George Whipple to let the Free 
Presbyterians of Virginia have the AMA schools in Richmond. 39 
The latter feared that Raymond, backed by General Butler, might 
still regain the Butler school house for a private schooi, 40 
and felt reluctant to release their claim in Richmond before 
they secured the property. In mid-August Reverend George 
William Hawkins, Corresponding Secretary for the NFRA, inquired 
about a home for his teachers in Richmond and Norfolk. 41 He 
still felt that the field constituted sufficient area and 
population for everyone to labor where they wished. 42 Manly 
expected the AMA to keep teachers in Richmond if he allowed 
Hawkins to hold a school in Norfolk because this action would 
negate Brown's commitment to the AMA. In this case, these two 
societies would crowd the Presbyterians out of the Richmond 
district and split their teachers between two cities. 
On August 30 Manly moved to break the stalemate. Defiantly 
he bypassed Hawkins' society in Richmond and proposed to give all 
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of the Richmond, Church Hill area to the General Association 
for the Care of the Freedmen, 43 This proposal included buildings 
previously promised to the NFRA. 44 At about the same time, 
Captain Wilder, Bureau Superintendent of the Hampton District, 
advised Whipple to get hold of the Butler School House or he 
might lose much of the property that went with the house. 45 On 
September 8 Manly forwarded papers for the house to Whipple, 46 
Realizing possession of the Butler property, the AMA released 
their claim on the Second Baptist Church in Richmond and prom-
ised to support Manly in whatever function he desired. 47 
Meanwhile, faced with the possibility of losing most of their 
proposed Richmond field, and watching the AMA further entrench 
themselves at Norfolk and Hampton, the NFRA quickly accepted 
another Manly offer to supply teachers solely to the Chimborazo 
refugee camp on the outskirts of Richmond48 and the Second 
Baptist Church in Richmond proper. The resulting plan left 
all the societies fairly centralized with an equal amount of 
urban territory. 
In October Manly became Acting Superintendent and pro-
ceeded to further implement the blueprint, Efforts to work 
out the practical details populated the districts in a more 
dispersed pattern than expected, Some societies carried schools 
through the summer so instead of trying to relocate they stayed 
in their established locations. The difficulties of switching 
buildings, rental agreements, agents, teacher-field relation-
ships, the lack of teachers, and the capacity of each society 
to adequately support its field necessitated many changes, 
By this time, however, all the societies cooperated fully 
with Manly to serve the needs of the field of labor, 
The AMA waited too late to mobilize their teachers, 
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and other societies took a share of Norfolk to help cover the 
field; The AMA clustered their schools in Norfolk proper and 
directly across the mouth of the James River at Hampton, 
Fortress Monroe and Camp Hamilton, The NFRA and the New 
England Freedmen's Aid Association (NEFAA) both helped support 
schools in and around Norfolk. The Philadelphia Friends of 
the Freedmen's Relief Association, the Free Will Baptists, 
and the Free Presbyterians of Virginia filled in the area from 
Hampton north along the James River. The rest of Manly's 
efforts worked successfully, The NFRA, the American Baptist 
Home Mission Society and the NEFAA based in and around Richmond 
and Petersburg, and the Pennsylvania Friends of the Freedmen 
Associated worked the Lynchburg field with their associates, 
the Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association. 49 
By December Manly had achieved his goal of centralization. 
Through his coordination the main societies enlarged and cen-
tralized their power bases. The AMA concentrated over thirty 
teachers to service the 1st District, the Hampton-Norfolk 
area and obtained sole control of the 6th District in the 
Shenandoah Valley. The NFRA and the BHMS split Petersburg 
and Richmond respectively, the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia 
Friends of the Freedmen's Societies settled more extensively 
in Lynchburg, the 7th District. The NEFAA supported the 4th 
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District including Charlottesville, Louisa, and Gardensville. 
The concentrated areas provided a base for each society to 
direct school activities, in the cities and outlying areas, 
to receive supplies and to centralize religious activities. 
The District Superintendents received monthly reports from 
each school and forwarded them to Manly's office where he 
consolidated and forwarded them to Washington. The society 
agents in each field usually doubled as the District Super-
intendent, Assistant Superintendent, or both, and kept in 
constant contact with Manly by mail. 
The Acting Superintendent's real obstacle was yet to 
come. On January 21, 1866, the Army mustered his regiment 
out of service50 and notified him in late February that he 
no longer received Army pay or privileges. Assistant Com-
missioner Brown wrote to Howard on February 28, asking for 
an order to allow Manly to remain in the service.51 Howard 
endorsed it on March J, and sent it to the Adjutant General's 
office which refused the request on March 5.52 Faced with 
the possibility of losing his Superintendent, Brown wrote 
another letter to Howard on March 9, asking that the Army 
revoke Chaplain Manly's muster out. He further asked that 
the Adjutant General date it retroactively from the date of 
his muster out because Manly stayed on duty consistently 
through the period of uncertainty. Brown stated that relieving 
Manly from duty "would be most injurious to the interests of 
the Freedmen. 11 53 Howard again endorsed the letter, and for-
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warded it to the Adjutant General's office, only to receive 
the reply that the request "cannot be favorably considered 
there being no precedent for such action, 11 54 Even though the 
Adjutant General refused to revoke Manly's muster out, Brown's 
and Howard's efforts credit the valuable work of their Acting 
Superintendent. Faced with no financial support, and only a 
slim possibility of being hired as a civilian due to the 
Bureau's lack of funds, Manly decided to stay as Acting Super-
intendent without pay to complete the school year, 
With a foundation established Manly moved to expand the 
schools. He realized that a good system needed consistency 
of personnel, facilities, and upward mobility. With determin-
ation he pushed to improve the system for the future, In 
March, 1866, Manly's system needed buildings, He understood 
that if he provided the buildings, the societi~s would make 
strenuous efforts to fill them. At the same time, Howard 
urged that the state superintendents investigate and report 
the physical conditions under which the schools operated. 
Manly received Charles A. Raymond on his staff as inspector 
of schools, and on March J, 1866, he ordered Raymond to visit 
the schools of the 1st District, Norfolk and Portsmouth, and 
report upon the conditions and usefulness of each city's 
schools.55 
Raymond's report detailed the inadequacy of the rooms 
used for schools, "Eighty students crammed into church base-
ments, upper rooms, parlors, and chambers in teachers' homes, 
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each of which were constructed to hold twenty-five persons 
at best." He went further to say that "the damp rooms, tor-
turing seats, crowded inmates, and general aspects of nakedness 
and discomfit" compared unfavorably with the contemporary 
northern public schools.56 On April 8th Manly ordered him to 
inspect the 2nd District.57 
Looking to the future, the Superintendent planned to 
use the blueprint to plan occupancy of the buildings for an 
even city distribution and equal society districting of schools 
in Richmond for the next year, but the Bureau lost the use of 
many buildings. Arsonists destroyed the Second Baptist Church, 
the building owned by a free black congregation.because they 
allowed the NFRA to operate a school there.58 Unfortunately 
all Manly could do in the way of repair consisted of asking 
different societies to help donate money for a re-erection of 
the building.59 Meanwhile the black congregation met elsewhere. 
This created a reluctance on the part of the black churches 
to use their buildings as schools. 
As spring moved into April, the military evacuation 
caused a general shakeup of the Reconstruction areas. As a 
result, Manly gained and lost various buildings in the city. 
At the same time Colonel Brown requested that the military 
turn over to the Bureau the unoccupied portion of Camp Winder, 
a military installation near Richm.ond. 60 In late March they 
planned to evacuate and sell the refugee camp at Chimborazo 
in the western end of the city. 61 Faced with losing the bulk 
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of the NFRA' s field, Manly planned to retain three of the 
Chimbora zo buildings and the one f r om Camp Wi nder, and more 
them to respective lots in the city. 62 In addition the Boston 
Branch of the American Freedmen's Union Commission (AFUC) which 
was formerly the NEFAA bought an old Confederate bakery with 
four good buildings that would provide many classrooms and 
teacher accommodations. 63 
Manly' s sketched map o:f Richmond to illustrate the , 
districting plan to William George Hawkins,- The numerals 
represent the scho.ols and teacher homes, #1 "Ebeneezer · 
Church*' Baptist Home Mission School; #2 "Duval Street 
Church" Boston Society; #'J "Bakery," Boston Society, #4 
2nd Baptist Church, New York National Freedmen's Relief 
Association1 #5 Methodist Church, Boston Society, #6 
St. Philips Church, Episcopal Mission Society; #7 Baptist 
Normal School; #8 1st African Church, Baptist Home 
Mission Society; #9 Chimborazo. 
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Manly again used a strict districting system to arrange 
the buildings_ vis-a-vis, the societies. The breadth of 
Richmond went from 1st to 32nd Street with Chimborazo west 
of 32nd Street. Six of the societies' school accommodations 
lay between 1st and 6th Streets including the Second Baptist 
Church and the bakery. A normal school and a primary school 
existed at 12th and 14th Streets, but no schools serviced 
the area between 14th Street and Chimborazo. If the Boston 
Branch took the Camp Winder building, the city would have 
facilities for 2,000 pupils saturating the area from 1st to 
6th Streets with almost nothing in the rest of the city. The 
Winder and Chimborazo buildings comprised enough space to 
serve the empty area. Manly proposed that the NFRA which 
became the New York Branch of the AFUC take the Winder Building 
and situate it nearer the empty end of the city to provide a 
more even distribution. 64 
Negotiations between the military, the Bureau and the 
societies finally took shape. On April 13th the military 
evacuated Chimborazo except for the women and children, and 
sold half of the camp at auction. Manly urged the New York 
Branch to make an application for retention of the three 
buildings they used. 65 He hoped to keep the property with 
one of them,_ thereby keeping one building at Chimborazo and 
the other two in needed areas of the city. 66 He urged Hawkins 
to locate the Winder Building west of 10th Street to help 
balance out the city network. 67 
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Writing to Hawkins to place the Winder Building in a 
specific location constituted a last resort. At the combin-
ation of the NFRA and the NEFAS into the American Freedmen's 
Union Commission, the two branches began to work through two 
Corresponding Secretaries, Reverend Thurston Chase and Hawkins, 
and one agent in Richmond, Reverend Andrew Washburn. When 
Manly originally asked to move the Winder Building, he con-
ferred with Chase who notified Washburn to purchase a site. 68 
He asked Chase to try to situate the building between 10th and 
32nd Streets so the New York Branch could use it to serve 
that area. Both Chase and Washburn belonged to the Boston 
Branch and wanted the building for extra accommodations for 
their teachers near 1st Street so the latter began appraising 
sites near there. Manly realized this, and wrote an angry 
letter to Hawkins. In this letter he stated the problem, 
included a map of the city schools and asked what was the 
Commission's purpose if not to aid in cooperation and communi-
cation. 
Manly achieved an even distribution by June, but not in 
the way he expected. Hawkins' New York Branch purchased the 
Winder Building and found a site at 6th and Duval Streets. 69 
Meanwhile, Manly picked up two new locations around 23rd and 
24th Streets and kept one building at Chimborazo, The BHMS 
decided not to send teachers into their primary school at 
14th Street for the next year, 70 but Manly asked the New York 
Friends of the Freedmen's Aid Society to support it. 71 In 
the resulting configuration, the Boston and New York Branches 
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o f the AFUC worked three districts in the city, while the 
NYFFAS took one district which comprised the west end of the 
city. 
The Freedmen's Bureau and the Army Appropriations Bill 
that Congress passed in early June greatly helped to investi-
gate and prepare buildings and their sites. The education 
provision of the Bureau Bill directed Commissioner Howard to 
provide school houses to benevolent societies who supported 
teachers. The Army Appropriations Bill gave the Bureau 
$ 500,000 to spend on renting and repairing school buildings. 72 
Almost simultaneously, Manly ordered Inspector Raymond to in-
spect the schools in the Charlottesville, Shenandoah, Lynchburg, 
and Alexandria districts.73 The bill also authorized the 
Secretary of War to retain in service, at the pay of their 
rank, Army officers on Bureau duty even after their regiment 
mustered out. It authorized payment of civilian agents and 
clerks out of $230,000 set aside from Army Appropriations.74 
With this new authority, Brown appointed Manly Superintendent 
of Education in a civilian capacity on July 6, 1866,75 and 
arranged salary payment retroactive to February. 
The same day Manly received and forwarded the Raymond 
reports for Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley to Howard.76 
By August he completed organization of the societies• commit-
ments to the field and the buildings to house them. 
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With a basic system established and the support of 
Orlando Brown, Manly used the next five years to develop and 
continue the system. As a principal he understood the neces-
sities of a good school system. He perceived problems of 
returning teachers and operating schoolhouses on a year to 
year basis, juggled financial resources to ensure necessary 
revenue and social intervention to provide a learning 
atmosphere, communicated results to Bureau Headquarters, and 
anticipated the future of the effort in light of the condi-
tions of the time. 
In order to continue an efficiently working system, the 
Superintendent enforced a reporting system on all the schools 
in the system. Each school made a complete report to his 
office, and then to the Bureau Commissioner, General O. O. 
Howard• s office in Washington. They included students enrolled 
by race, attendance, classes, buildings and owners, and en-
rollment in each of the seven subjects and in "high school.1177 
His staff of assistant superintendents, inspectors and local 
superintendents insured the reliability and punctuality of tm 
reports. Manly provided both the Bureau office in Washington 
and the benevolent organizations with minute information on 
the progress of every Bureau associated school in Virginia. 
The Superintendent took quick action to solve any prob-
lems that came to light. Six months after Inspector Charles 
Raymond's report on the cramped school conditions in Norfolk 
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in March, 1866, Manly tripled the usable space for the stu-
dent population. 78 He often went into the various local 
districts by train and by horse to lecture on the various 
school problems and initiate new schools. In one instance, 
a free Black community refused to allow their children to 
learn under a Freedman unless he was "light complected." 
IV!anly advised them that they would not have one, and reassigned 
the teacher. Later, a leader of the community asked for the 
teacher back.79 Manly also travelled to Washington often to 
personally push monetary appropriations. 
The Superintendent's most pressing problems were fiscal, 
but his efficiency and resourcefulness produced the best 
results on the Bureau's small appropriations, the benevolent 
organization's resources, and the Freedmen's donations. In 
October, 1867, many of the (AMA) teachers came late to begin 
the fall session because of a shortage of money. 80 Manly 
attack ed the problem immediately by trying to enlist more 
support from the Freedmeno Even though the donations depended 
on crop yield, the Superintendent estimated that perhaps one 
fourth of the needed money could be obtained from the Freedmen 
with good management. During the period from 1867 to 1870, 
he continually juggled the resources to obtain the best possible 
result. 
In the summer of 1869 aid from the societies diminished 
because of the advent of a state free school system, and a 
drought blighted the Freedmen's crops. In spite of this 
I-
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Manly reported an increase in attendance for the first part 
of the following school year of a twenty-two percent average. 81 
He ascribed the unexpected increase to a last ditch interest 
by the people and a rigid application of a new rule not to fur-
nish rental money to a proposed school unless it secured an 
average attendance of thirty pupils. 82 Efforts such as this 
continued a static environment for the growth of the state 
schools. 
Over the five year period between 1865 and 1870, 
using the system based on the Norfolk blueprint, the Bureau 
taught 50,000 previously ignorant slaves the elements of a 
primary education. It erected over two hundred schoolhouses 
including Normal Institutes in Richmond, Hampton, Charlottes-
ville, and Petersburg, and trained scores of teachers. 83 The 
first small mission at Hampton had grown until its blossom 
was the most extensive Freedmen's education system in the Post 
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CONCLUSION 
The AMA and army personnel were primarily respon-
sible for the tremendous success of the Freedmen's 
Bureau system im Virginia. Through the development and 
implementation of the Norfolk blueprint, they developed 
many of the main factors needed to insure a good school 
system. The blueprint generalized the experience of 
the Hampton Roads missions to the state as a whole, and 
the dedication of the personnel involved enabled them 
to overcome the many obstacles that they faced educating 
a large illiterate population with meager resources. 
The efforts of the AMA to develop the schools in 
Hampton Roads created the proper conditions to develop 
the blueprint. In 1861, Lockwood's imagination encom-
passed the possibility of educated slaves. Six months 
later he envisioned a successful mission complex to 
impress visiting politicians with the evils of slavery, 
and thereby contribute to the liberation of the slaves. 
The struggles with Wool and Dix gave the AMA undisputed 
voice in the control of the Hampton Roads mission field 
which they developed for the entire decade. 
Developing and expanding in the face of tremendous 
obstacles earned them experienced personnel, coopera tion 
of the army, and support of the people. The struggle 
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to build along side the free Negro's of Hampton and the 
contrabands who endured the r igors of camp life in the 
midst of active war campaigns welded the hope of the 
contrabands to the efforts of the purveyors of education, 
It established the foundation for the missions in the 
area and a base from which to expand into Norfolk and 
Portsmouth. 
After the occupation of Norfolk and Portsmouth, 
Hampton served as the base for preparation to move 
:irrrothe Twin Cities. The hardships the missionaries 
endured during the summer and fall before emancipation 
insured that the foundation remained secure and the 
missions consolidated for the time when expansion to 
the Twin Cities was possible. 
The Norfolk and Portsmouth farms supplied the 
stability for a constant school contraband populationo 
Up to that time, the main ingredients which kept the 
contraband population stable were the constant influx 
of refugees and the fact that women and children made 
up most of the population, Butler's General Order #64 
led the way for expansion by allowing the missionaries 
and superintendents to progress with ideas they had 
nurtured a.nd developed for over a year. Woodbury's 
coordination of the missions with Brown's efforts to 
organize and care for the refugees, and the late sum-
mer 1 63 reorganization reaped rewards when the 
lJl 
order came because the missions had the capability to 
expand from a solid base. 
Being an urban area of high population density, the 
Twin Cities area attracted many different societies 
whose goals were to proselytize and teach. In 1864 it 
was also a good base to move into other areas of the 
state and North Carolina. Fearing the disruption of 
their system, Woodbury and Brown created the blueprint 
plan to district the cities according to population 
vis-a-vis the societies. The highly successful system 
allowed the societies to reach one third more children 
with their resources, and controlled the movement of the 
student population to achieve static attendance. 
The implementation of the blueprint in the Freed-
men's Bureau solved many problems. The disruption 
caused by the end of the war and the infusion of many 
new societies into the state threatened to hopelessly 
cast the state into a disorganized hodge-podge of small 
competitive school complexes. After a society inhabited 
buildings and garnered a student population changing to 
another area was virtually impossible. Instituting a 
state system needed to be done at the outset. The job 
fell to Manly largely by coincidence, but he was well-
suited to administer a large system. Having adminis-
tered a seminary in Vermont he understood the intri-
cacies of educating many students on meager resources, 
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and was familiar with the Norfolk system. He recognized 
early that the Norfolk bluepr int was the key to organi-
zing the state system, and from that point concent rated 
on implementing it with hard work and persistence. 
The single most important factor in the success of 
the blueprint and the schools was the continuity of 
personnel. To insure mission progress during the war 
years, Whipple and Jocelyn endeavored to make smooth 
personnel transitions. Close communications, some times 
as much as a letter a day, and never over three or f our 
day intervals, characterized the relationship between 
the corresponding secretaries and the supervisors at 
Hampton Roads. Each time a new supervisor arrived or 
the leadership of the mission changed hands, the new 
supervisor studied the mission for many weeks before 
he assumed an active leadership role, and then always 
made decisions with the thorough approval of Whipple 
and Jocelyn. 
Working hand in hand with Whipple and Jocelyn, 
Brown was necessarily close to this process and adopted 
it to administering the Bureau. He kept Manly under his 
wing for the year of the latter's Acting Superintendency. 
Working in the same building as Manly he directed him 
closely, endorsed all of the first school reports to 
Howard, and in the beginning all the crucial letters o 
The AMA gave much thought to placing the ir leaderso 
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1J4 
There were four types of mission personnels teachers, 
preachers, pioneer missionaries, and administrators. In 
addition some worked under particular conditions, and others 
under any conditions, Whipple and Jocelyn tried to match 
their strengths with the work needed to be done. They 
searched all spring for Woodbury to run the Norfolk system. 
One other factor important to continuity of personnel 
was the dedication of the workers themselves. The individual 
sacrifices of the many missionaries, and administrators 
served to reduce the many obstacles and keep the missions 
moving at an ever progressing pace. The AMA looked 
especially for dedicated competent men. After they changed 
their policy to primarily education in 186J they began to 
look for competent educators. Subsequently most of their 
people were dedicated to educating the contraband as well 
or more so than proselytizing them. In the case of Brown and 
Manly, their personal dedication saw them through the l ong 
time period. Between these two people and the AMA three 
of the most important ingredients for a successful school 
system were met, strong leadership, consistency and support 
of a stable student populationo In this sense the leader-
ship of the AMA, Brown and Manly were primarily responsible 
for the successful results. 
Three secondary themes ran through the account of the 
mission's growth that shed light on possible missions 
influence on national policies, To a large degree the 
Hampton missions led to the creation of Freedmen's Bureau. 
The missions dealt the last blow at slavery from a well 
established abolitionist movement, and the coincidence 
of events at the missions and changes of federal policy 
revealed a very strong influence on federal policy on 
the whole. 
The Freedmen's Bureau evolved from a series of 
efforts beginning in 1862, and the Hampton Roads Missions 
influenced these efforts at many points. The American 
Freedmen's Inquiry Commission almost exactly resembled 
General Wool's Investigatory Commission of one year 
earlier, which was called due to the complaints of 
Lockwood, and recommended all his suggestions in their 
report. The AFIC investigated the contraband situation 
in many occupied areas, but came out with the same general 
conclusions as Wool's Investigatory Commission. The 
resulting experiments followed exactly as the AFIC 
recommended through Butler's General Order #64, and the 
Plan of the Bureau for the leasing of the farms was 
identical to the one used in the Hampton Roads experi-
ments. 
The Hampton Roads area itself lent to the influence 
of the Freedmen's Bureau. Its proximity to Washington 
allowed many legislators to visit and view first hand 
the results of the experiments, and its location in 
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an active theater of war increased the dependability of 
systems deemed successful in the midst of much consterna-
tion. In addition the Hampton Roads area was dear to 
Stanton, who authorized the first farm experiments, and 
the Radical Republicans who pushed the appointment of 
Butler. These were precisely the people who envisioned 
and implemented the Bureau. After 186J the Hampton 
Roads missions became a proving ground for possible 
Bureau programs, and a successful prototype for the 
Bureau. 
The missions dealt the last blow at slavery by the 
well established abolitionist movement. Endeavoring to 
prove the potential of the N9gro to the North and the 
South for many years every scrap of evidence of the Negro's 
ability to learn and self subsist at Hampton Roads 
was published by the AMA and other represented periodicals 
at Fortress Monroe. The first effort was a supple-
ment on Fortress Monroe and Lockwood in October 1861. 
From then on letters from the teachers, Superintendents, 
and missionaries inundated the northern population with 
the evils of slavery, made all the more horrible because 
of the newly proven potential of the"African" race. 
Lectures to the North, visitors to Monroe, teacher's 
letters home, articles in magazines and all the major 
newspapers harped on the new found results of the Black 
man to labor and learn in a free society. Many new 
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societies to help the freedmen, and contributions to aid 
in the work found their way back to the missions in all 
the occupied areas. This propaganda greatly helped to 
change the emphasis of the Union toward emancipation. 
The close coincidence of Federal Policy and the 
changes in the Fortress Monroe Missions showed the mis-
sion~ growth influencing federal policy. From the first 
cooperation of Lockwood and Wool in 1861 Federal Policy 
had a great effect on the establishment of the rights of 
the contraband, and vice versa. Lockwood 0 s problems and 
the AMA push for General Wool's Investigatory Com-
mission in February 1@62 committed the government to a 
policy of aiding the contraband very early in the war. 
The organization of the contrabands and establishment 
of schools at the 111issions forced the army to initiate 
some policy. The AMA's continual badgering of Dix 
during the summer and fall of 1862 insured a continuation 
of that policy. At the same time Whipple's strategy 
with the General rewarded the effort in the months after 
emancipation. Finally, influencing public opinion 
through the mission results the missions helped Lincoln 
realize that more support for the war would come from 
freeing the slaves than simply reuniting the Union. 
One of the most valuable evidences produced by the 
13? 
missions was the ability of the contraband to peacefully 
work and learn in the midst of the chaos of the Peninsula 
campaign. This dispelled many visions of disruption after 
emancipation, mass insurrection, and inability of the 
freedmen to cope with an independent society. 
The most obvious contribution was through education. 
The Freedmen's Schools of Virginia educated over 50,000 
freedmen between 1865 and 187.0. Due to the persistence 
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of Manly and the development of the Norfolk ~lueprint as a 
foundation, the system largely contributed to a first and 
most successful state school system in the Southern states. 
The Virginia State Public School System began on the heels 
of the Freedmen's system, and borrowed much from it. It 
was this system that actually changed Virginians' minds to 
the necessity of educating the black population, and public 
education in general. The education legacy from Reconstruc-
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